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IS THAT ALL THERE IS?: "THE PROBLEM"
IN COURT-ORIENTED MEDIATION*
Leonard L. Riskin'" and Nancy A. Welsh'
INTRODUCTION
A cartoon shows a king and his queen seated on either side of an advi-
sor, who is looking at the king. "You said, 'Off with her head,"' says the
advisor, "but what I heard was 'I feel neglected."'" Plainly, this advisor was
trying to do something that a good mediator should do 2-help the parties
understand the psychological and emotional "interests" that precipitated the
king's "position" and consider whether that position actually fosters his
interests.' Such attention to underlying interests, the real concerns of the
parties, has been one of the great promises of mediation, at least to many
early "mediation imperialists"4 who saw its potential for loosening the
pinched perspective that typically dominates litigation practices and settle-
ment discussions in cases that are, or are likely to be, in the litigation
stream. The idea was that mediation could help the parties exercise auton-
* Copyright © 2008 Leonard L. Riskin and Nancy A. Welsh
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Drawing by Mike Ewers, in RONALD B. ADLER ET AL., LOOKING OUT, LOOKING IN 27 (2005).
2 See Deborah R. Hensler, In Search of "Good" Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice and Empiricism,
in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 231, 254-55 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds.,
2001) (describing attorneys' process evaluations, as well as their assessments of how satisfactory and
fair mediation was for their clients, based on new analyses of the Rand ADR data).
3 A "position" is what a party says she wants or is entitled to; an "interest" is the need or goal that
motivates the party to assert the position. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-42 (2d ed. 1991).
4 We are inspired by Professor Robert Mnookin's likely half-humorous charactization of himself
as a "negotiation imperialist." Robert Mnookin, When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialist
Reflects on Appropriate Limits, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (2003).
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omy,5 not only in agreeing to a solution, but also in determining the focus
of the mediation ("the problem definition"6); such autonomy, the reasoning
goes, could lead to a broader problem definition and to processes and solu-
tions that were better suited to the parties' real needs.7
This Article focuses on what we call "court-oriented" mediations in
"ordinary"' civil, non-family disputes (such as personal injury matters, em-
ployment cases, contract and property damage disputes, medical malprac-
tice claims, and the like). Generally, these mediations take place in the
shadow of the courthouse, as someone has already filed a lawsuit or con-
templates doing so if the mediation does not produce an agreement. They
typically include one individual plaintiff and one or more defendants. Law-
yers and insurance claims representatives are nearly always involved. In
some of these cases, courts order or coax the parties into mediation; in oth-
ers, the parties enter mediation voluntarily. The mediation sessions may be
conducted as part of a court-connected program or privately. Without
doubt, some of these mediations deal with the parties' underlying interests
and non-legal issues.9 Based upon available empirical evidence and conver-
sations with mediators around the country, however, it appears that the
problem definition in most court-oriented mediation sessions is quite nar-
row, dominated by litigation-oriented risk analysis and valuation." Simi-
larly, these mediations' outcomes do not vary much from those produced by
lawyers' traditional bilateral negotiations. 1
The plaintiffs in these cases are often "one-shot players"; that is, they
have very little or no experience with litigation and the ways of courts.'2
The same is true for many defendants. For one-shot players, involvement in
litigation is far from ordinary. Indeed, many have resorted to the courts only
because they have been caught up in once-in-a-lifetime, unique, or catastro-
phic events. Only the lawyers, mediators, and insurance claims representa-
5 Autonomy is more likely to be described as "self-determination" in mediation literature. See,
e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 16 (2001).
6 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 18 (1996) (describing problem definition as "[t]he focus
of a mediation-its subject matter and the problems or issues it seeks to address").
7 See Mnookin, supra note 4, at 1083.
8 These types of cases have also been described as "ordinary litigation" involving individual
plaintiffs. E.g. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 30 (1991); HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS
AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 36, 38 (1990).
9 See infra Part I, notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
11 Id.
12 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95, 97-110 (1974) (generally theorizing that repeat players hold an
advantage over one-shot players; categorizing personal injury insurers as repeat players and personal
injury plaintiffs as one-shot players).
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tives-the "repeat players"13 in the litigation system-consider such cases
"ordinary" and effectively narrow both the definition" of the problem to be
resolved and the set of available remedies. These repeat players 5 set the
scope of inquiry and the procedures, often without any explicit discussion
13 See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief Trust,
and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J. DIsP. RESOL. 131, 145-46 (observing that though corporations may be
institutional repeat players, the managers and officers involved in litigation generally are not repeat
players and do not express faith in the courts) (citing John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey
of Business Lawyers 'and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 39 (1998)); Galanter, supra
note 12, at 97-110. Some commentators have focused on the fates of one-shot players and repeat players
in ADR processes. See, e.g., J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK 42-46 (2007) (describing
differences between repeat players and one-time plaintiffs and their relationship to their lawyers in
mediation sessions); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves " Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 58 (1999) ("We have little em-
pirical verification of the claims made both for and against arbitration and ADR, including positive
assertions made about reduced cost, speed, and access to dispute mechanisms, as we really do not have
much data about whether one-shotters always do worse in institutionally established ADR, although the
Bingham and Engalla data do demonstrate some clear areas for concern."). Other commentators have
considered the differing interests and expectations of one-shot and repeat players in various contexts.
See, e.g., H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT 152-54 (1970) (examining the interests of repeat players, specifically insurance claims
adjusters and lawyers, largely in routine cases involving small amounts in controversy); Stewart Macau-
lay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55-56 (1963)
(examining expectations of businessmen and lawyers in contract disputes, and the "functions and dys-
functions of using contract to solve exchange problems"); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What
Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984) (focusing
primarily on the interests of individual plaintiffs and finding that once they seek assistance from courts
or attorneys, they want vindication). See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1994) (examining the day-to-day behavior of police and
other legal actors to see how they come to interpret legal constraints). A slightly different but related
focus involves comparing individual and organizational litigants' characteristics and resolution patterns.
See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differ-
ences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1280-81 (2005) (finding that "individual plaintiff cases are substantially more
likely to be determined by an adjudication---especially a non-trial adjudication-than are organizational
plaintiff cases" and finding "evidence that organizational plaintiffs-when pitted against either individ-
ual or organizational defendants-are substantially more likely to settle their cases than to have them
decided either by trial or nontrial adjudication."). Hadfield also finds that if federal lawsuits for the
recovery of defaulted student loans are excluded from consideration, "organizations are defendants in
more than 80% of all federal civil litigation; individuals are plaintiffs in almost 70%." Id. at 1298.
14 We are not referring to the private mediation of large commercial disputes with sophisticated
parties on both sides. In these cases, it is quite likely that the parties are involved in the development of
the mediation process and influence the problem definition. See Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice
System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 927, 930-33 (2002).
15 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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or recognition of the many available alternative formulations 6 and often
without the influence of the one-shot players. They tend to focus narrowly
on two questions: First, what would happen if the parties litigated this case?
Second, how much is the defendant willing to pay and the plaintiff willing
to accept to avoid the delay, risks, and costs of trial? The lawyers and me-
diators then implement mediation procedures that they think will enable
them to address those questions efficiently. 7 Such procedures typically
exclude a consideration of the parties' motivations. In addition, they usually
emphasize private caucuses rather than joint sessions, 8 and offer few, if
any, opportunities for the parties to speak or listen to each other directly. 9
Thus, such mediations foster a bracketed understanding of the dispute and
rational-cognitive-legal approaches to resolving it,2" which generally pre-
clude explicit, shared attention to underlying interests,2' particularly the
psychological and emotional needs of the parties, or other non-legal con-
cems.
For many one-shot players who have chosen (or might choose) litiga-
tion to resolve their disputes, this narrow approach may be wholly appro-
priate and even preferable.22 In some segment of cases, though, the exclu-
sive focus on litigation means that at least some of these parties miss out on
opportunities for processes and outcomes that could be far better suited to
their needs.
This gap between the expansive potential of mediation and the con-
stricted reality of most court-oriented mediation-which has many causes
and many effects-is the challenge this Article seeks to address. Ultimately,
this Article proposes that all parties, including the one-shot players in ordi-
nary civil cases, should have opportunities to influence the development of
the problem definition. We hope such opportunities can lead to the selection
16 Bryant Garth has noted that there is a growing difference between the mass processing offered
by court-connected mediation programs and the individualized treatment offered to "larger" clients with
"larger" cases. See Garth, supra note 14, at 930.
17 See infra Part I.B.2.
18 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
20 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 137 (1997).
21 Meanwhile, recent research indicates that repeat mediation users assess mediators' ability to
listen for interests as very important. See John Lande & Rachel Wohl, Listening to Experienced Users:
Improving Quality and Use of Commercial Mediation, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2007, at 18.
22 See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons
from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 422-23 (2004-2005) (ob-
serving that "most parties participating in court-connected mediation" perceive outcomes as fair or
satisfactory, and research indicates that parties "appreciate mediators' help in achieving outcomes that
are consistent with the rule of law"). Also, as Professor Robert Ackerman has observed, when plaintiffs
invoke the power of the courts, it is reasonable to assume that they seek the application of legal norms.
Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 27, 55 (2002).
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of the problem definition that is most appropriate. In Part I, the Article
elaborates upon the gap between court-oriented mediation's potential for
broad problem definition and the narrow focus of most mediations, using a
case study for illustration. Part II sets forth a systematic method for "set-
ting" the appropriate problem definition in a given mediation, and then de-
scribes three approaches that courts (and private providers) could undertake
to encourage and assist parties in developing the most appropriate problem
definitions and processes. We offer these approaches to begin a dialogue
regarding the most effective and administrable mechanisms to give parties
the opportunity to influence the focus of their mediations. Part III explains
why we propose that courts provide these opportunities to parties, rather
than relying on the parties themselves or their lawyers to take the initiative.
I. THE GAP BETWEEN ASPIRATION AND REALITY IN COURT-ORIENTED
MEDIATION
With the advent of notice pleading,23 the easing of access to the
courts,24 and legislative encouragement of private litigation to enforce pub-
lic rights,2" state and federal courts in the U.S. attend to a strikingly wide
variety of private and public ills.26 And in the public imagination, courts
provide a unique function as the public forum that can best discover the
details of an individual case and adjudicate it.27 Yet the courts condition
access upon a particular focus. In civil proceedings, the "problem" defined
by the pleadings must state a sufficiently recognizable legal claim.2" If the
plaintiff meets this relatively low hurdle,29 the court permits discovery-but
23 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
24 See Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from
Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 59-63 (1991) (discussion of the expansion of no-fault divorce and no-fault
torts).
25 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (2000) (fee-shifting provision of the Family Medical Leave
Act allowing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other costs in addition to the
judgment).
26 See Herbert M. Kritzer, American Adversarialism, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 349, 349-51 (2004);
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-105 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Perennial Classics 2000) (1835).
27 In a foreword to the published proceedings of the 1976 Pound Conference, three former ABA
presidents observed that Americans "feel and see that they are getting a measure of justice in the courts,
the kind of respectful attention and thoughtful consideration that they do not think they get anywhere
else ...." THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE 11 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 See Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 736-37 (2005).
29 The precise height of this hurdle, however, remains a matter of contention. Compare Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintif can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
2008]
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only for information that is relevant to the legal claims and defenses in the
case.3" In pre-trial motions and at trial, the "problem" remains narrow: what
is the applicable law, what are the legally relevant facts, and how do they
mesh?3
But mediation is an entirely different story-or at least that has been a
dominant theory.32 Conventional wisdom among a segment of influential
would entitle him to relief.") with Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974 (2007)
(criticizing Conley as an "incomplete, negative gloss" and requiring that a complaint contain "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face").
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense .... For good cause, the court may order discovery of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.").
31 See FED. R. CiV. P. 50(a)(2) (requiring the moving party to specify the law and facts in a motion
for judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. C1v. P. 56 (stating that a motion for summary judgment should
be granted if the pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits establish that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law).
32 There has been great debate over the definition and purpose of mediation. Many commentators,
for example, have written regarding the occurrence and appropriateness of evaluative interventions in
mediation. See David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Obser-
vations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 613, 637-38 (1989) (identify-
ing "selective facilitation" as a technique for mediators to use to influence outcomes); Kimberlee K.
Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 31, 31 (1996) (declaring that evaluative mediation activities "are inconsistent with the role of a
mediator"); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin 's Grid, 3
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 75-77 (1998) (arguing that the definition of mediation should not include
evaluative services); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 937, 937-38 (1997) (analyzing why evaluative activities are inconsistent with a media-
tor's role); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?,
38 S. TEx. L. REV. 669, 675 (1997) (theorizing that "mediator evaluation can assist the parties in their
self-determination efforts"); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 775-77, 796-99 & n. 105
(1999) (arguing that self-determination is undermined by the absence of informed consent and noting
that some commentators suggest that evaluative techniques can increase informed consent); Joseph B.
Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 985, 985-86, 1001-02 (1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 44-45, 47 (1996)
(acknowledging that evaluative techniques "can interfere with the parties' coming to understand fully
their own and each other's positions and interests" and "with the development of creative solutions");
Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 501, 511 (1997) ("Rather than interfering with the self-determination of parties to resolve their
own dispute, activist interventions by the mediator may enhance the parties' empowerment by educating
them and by aiding their realistic understanding of the alternatives to agreement."). Particularly for
court-connected cases, some commentators have urged that mediation should produce outcomes that are
consistent with the justice norms that the disputants had invoked by being in court. See James H. Stark,
Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 487
(1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing
a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 966 (1997) (suggesting that "the
formalist 'facilitative' model of mediation" should not be elevated "above the practical needs of dispu-
tants and the fairness concerns that must animate decisionmaking in any government-sponsored pro-
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commentators on mediation holds that the process has several capacities
that courts lack.33 It can empower the parties to work together in a respect-
ful and productive manner; allow a focus on the parties' real needs and in-
terests, in addition to their legal claims; offer a flexible process customized
to fit the parties' situation, emotions, and interests; and encourage the de-
velopment of a range of creative and responsive outcomes.34 In appropriate
situations, mediation may even enable the parties to heal or restructure their
relationships, both personal and professional.35
ceeding"); Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 745-57 (1997) (describing appropriate settings for a norm-advocating
approach to mediation). Some also have argued for the primacy of the transformative model of media-
tion. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING
TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 95 (1994).
33 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308,
328-27 (1971) (analyzing mediation as one of the only forms of social ordering that does not have
government power or authority as its primary focus).
34 See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982); Welsh, supra
note 5, at 16-20. See also JAN B.M. VRANKEN, EXPLORING THE JURIST'S FRAME OF MIND:
CONSTRAINTS AND PRECONCEPTIONS IN CIVIL LAW ARGUMENTATION 104-06 (2006) (urging the greater
suitability of mediation for cases in which courts cannot "protect" an important emotional interest with
judicial remedies or a party's legal claim does not represent her real interest).
35 See Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664
(1985) (recognizing settlement as "a process of reconciliation"). See also Jean R. Stemlight, ADR Is
Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2002-2003)
(urging a system of justice to consider protecting rights and improving relationships). Research indi-
cates, however, that civil non-family mediation frequently does not realize this potential. See Dwight
Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Process of Repair-or Separation? An Empirical Study, and its Implica-
tions, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 331 (2002) ("Even when able mediators work with parties whose
dispute arises in the context of a significant prior connection with each other, relationship repairs in
legal mediation appear to be uncommon events ...."); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 67 (2004) (identifying four
studies where only a minority of litigants believed that mediation improved the relationship between the
parties, with most studies finding that a significant percentage of litigants did not perceive litigation as
improving the relationship between the parties). It could be that academics and practitioners who appre-
ciate mediation's potential for a more humanistic, relation-oriented approach find themselves at odds
with the psychological and rights-oriented profile of those who dominate actual civil non-family media-
tion sessions. Professor Susan Daicoff observed that one response to the dissonance between a rights-
oriented profile and an ethic of care may be to "attempt[] to change the lawyer's role and lawyering to
incorporate a care orientation." Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1402 (1997). Other re-
sponses can include denial of the conflict or dividing one's personality so that the ethic of care domi-
nates personal and family life while the analytical side dominates one's professional life. Id. See also
Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuading the Legal Profes-
sion to Define Problems More Humanistically, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming) (describing psycho-
logical, professional, and business reasons that lawyers may resist a more humanistic approach to re-
solving disputes).
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In recent years, many state and federal trial and appellate courts have
begun to order or proffer mediation in large numbers of civil non-family36
cases.37 After some initial resistance, many lawyers now voluntarily select
mediation for their cases, either before or after filing. 8 In-house counsel for
major corporations regularly report that they favor the use of mediation
over arbitration or other processes.39
36 We emphasize that we are focusing here on civil non-family mediation. Though court-
connected family mediation also employs this narrow conception of the problems mediation should
address, there is evidence that the process frequently addresses a broader array of issues. See Nancy A.
Welsh, Reconciling Self-Determination, Coercion, and Settlement in Court-Connected Mediation, in
DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 420, 423-24 (Jay Fol-
berg et al. eds., 2004). This may be because all of those involved in a custody dispute (i.e., judge, law-
yers, mediator, perhaps even the parents) recognize that the court does not have the resources (or proba-
bly the desire) to serve as a close monitor of the ongoing implementation of the agreement reached by
the parents, and greater participation by the parents in the creation and customization of a consensual
agreement should increase their rate of compliance with it. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman,
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW AND SOC'Y REV.
11, 37-38 (1984).
37 In 2004, for example, 13,566 federal district court cases were referred to mediation; in 2005, 68
of 94 federal district courts had authorized referral to mediation. See Donna Stienstra, Emerging Issues
in Federal Court ADR, Presentation at The Dickinson School of Law of Penn State University (Sept. 12,
2005) (presentation materials on file with author). In 2006-2007, 2,070 general district court mediations
and 280 circuit court mediations occurred in Virginia. See ADR-The Wave of the Future, Overview
and Statistics, http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/generalinfo/overview-and statistics.pdf. In 2005-06,
all twenty Florida judicial circuits ordered some percentage of substantial ($15,000) non-family civil
cases (i.e., "circuit" cases) into mediation. FLA. STATE COURTS, FLORIDA MEDIATION & ARBITRATION
PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM 73 (19th ed., 2005-2006), http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/adr/bin/2006
%20Compendium.pdf. Seven of those circuits kept sufficient data to report that they had ordered 8,947
circuit court cases into mediation in 2005-2006, while 6,494 of these were mediated. Id. at 75. See also
Sharon Press, Institutionalization of Mediation in Florida: At the Crossroads, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 43,
55 (2003) (observing that Florida's "'official' statistics only tell part of the story because court sup-
ported mediators and mediation programs exist alongside a thriving private mediator sector").
38 See Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of the Role of Different
Forms of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys' ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 199, 207-17 (2002) (observing that lawyers are more likely to use ADR if they had previously used
ADR and that some attorneys voluntarily use mediation in anticipation of a court order). See also
McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 407-08 (noting that attorneys' selection of mediation, motivated by
Minnesota's mandatory consideration rule and judges' routine ordering of ADR, helped lead to the
institutionalization of mediation).
39 A recent survey in ADR trends asked the following question: "How would you rank the adop-
tion of ADR techniques in your organization over the past 3 years?" With 5 meaning "high" and 1
meaning "low," corporate counsel assigned the following scores: mediation (4.00); early case assess-
ment (4.00); arbitration (2.74); multi-step ADR clauses (2.84); internal ADR training (2.67); ADR
training for business clients (2.12); lawyers at law firms assigned the following scores: mediation (3.89);
early case assessment (3.37); arbitration (3.76); multi-step ADR clauses (3.28); internal ADR training
(2.99); ADR training for business clients (2.55). CPR Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution,
The CPR Survey on Alternative Dispute Resolution Trends (conducted first quarter 2007),
http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/surv-apr07.pdf. See also David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of
Control: The Corporate Embrace ofADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 136, 138-39 (1998) (describ-
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Available evidence is mixed at best, however, regarding whether these
mediation sessions fulfill the expansive promise described above.40 Cer-
tainly, some people and programs work hard to develop the most appropri-
ate problem definition in mediation. Many mediators, for example, are
committed to offering parties opportunities to exercise influence4 and to
understand and address all of the issues and interests that are important to
them.42 There is evidence that a growing percentage of lawyers who handle
ing a survey of corporate counsel of the 1,000 largest U.S.-based corporations conducted for the Cor-
neIl/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution in which over a majority believed "mediation provided
parties with a more satisfactory process than litigation" by "provid[ing] more satisfactory settlements"
and "preserv[ing] good relationships").
40 See Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: Business as
Usual?, MEDIATION Q., Summer 2000, at 377, 382 (stating that in the North Carolina Mediated Settle-
ment Conference Program, of attorneys surveyed, "[t]here is less evidence of lawyers' adopting prob-
lem-solving (integrative) strategies" and that "[s]ixty-three percent (63%) of respondents thought that
exchanging offers and demands until settlement is reached is the main purpose of mediation."). See also
Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-Ordered
Civil Case Mediation, 19 JUST. SYs. J. 311, 332 (1997) (reporting that mediation has not changed law-
yers' approach to settlement negotiation).
41 We believe that this is consistent with the current version of the Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators (also called the "Joint Standards") which provides in Standard I "Self-Determination"
that:
A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determina-
tion. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which
each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome. Parties may exercise
self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator selection, process design,
participation in or withdrawal from the process, and outcomes.
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard 1 (2005) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfina105.pdf. The parties'
right to self- determination as to process design implies their influence in developing the problem defini-
tion. As we will show, however, in actual practice the design choice often is made almost automatically
by the repeat players. See infra Part I.B.1. One challenge in getting at this problem is the common
assumption that the lawyer ordinarily carries out the client's wishes. Recently commentators have pro-
moted the importance of the concept of informed consent in mediation. See, e.g., John W. Cooley &
Lela P. Love, Midstream Mediator Evaluations and Informed Consent, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter
2008, at 11; Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Consent in Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2008, at 4;
Frank E.A. Sander, Achieving Meaningful Threshold Consent to Mediator Style(s), DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2008, at 8. None of these writings, however, explicitly identifies the problem definition as a
topic on which the parties should exercise self-determination,
42 This may be unrelated to whether a mediator explicitly subscribes to a particular model of
mediation. Some models of mediation, however, focus explicitly on the attainment of these goals. For
example, many mediators have been trained in the "understanding-based" model of mediation, as well
as "transformative" mediation. The understanding-based model focuses on the enhancement of mutual
understanding and eschews the use of caucuses. See generally GARY J. FRIEDMAN & JACK
HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: THE UNDERSTANDING-BASED MODEL OF MEDIATION (forth-
coming 2008). The transformative model emphasizes disputants' "voice and choice." See BUSH &
FOLGER, supra note 32, at 95. The first explication of this approach urged mediators to view settlement
as a by-product of mediation, rather than its goal. Id. at 106-07. In subsequent work, Bush and Folger
have clarified their conception of the place of conflict resolution in transformative mediation:
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significant commercial litigation,4 3 as well as parties who are involved in
multi-party, polycentric disputes,' recognize the value of uncovering and
addressing interests in mediation. The rules of some court-connected pro-
grams explicitly include interests in their descriptions of mediation and
By focusing firmly on the parties' own deliberation, decision making and perspective
taking, transformative mediators encourage genuine, voluntary, fully informed settlements to
emerge as and when the parties deem them appropriate. But they do not prescribe the pa-
rameters of the agreement or define settlement as the only possible successful outcome for a
mediation session. Reaching agreement is one decision the parties may make if they so
choose.
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 217 (Revised ed., 2005)
(emphasis in original).
43 A group of lawyers with significant commercial mediation experience (often in the roles of both
lawyers and mediators), for example, recently identified "satisfy[ing] parties' underlying interests" as
one of their usual goals for the process. See ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF MEDIATION, FINAL REPORT: APRIL 2006-MARCH 2007 7 (2007),
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/Final-ReportTaskForceMediationQuality.pdf (reporting
that "[s]atisfying the parties' underlying interests is also an important goal for users and mediators in
about half or more of their cases (81% mediation users, 92% mediators")); ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY, Mean Survey Responses by Respon-
dent Type, at 3 (Apr. 16, 2007 Draft) (on file with authors) (on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 described as "not
at all important" and 5 as "essential," "understanding parties' interests" received a mean score of 4.29
from mediation users in response to the question "How important are the following skills, qualities, or
functions for mediators to be effective?"). See also Lande & Wohl, supra note 21, at 18-20 (reporting
focus group results identifying various goals for mediation besides settlement); Julie Macfarlane, Cul-
ture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL.
241, 266 (listing mediation's secondary benefits besides bringing parties together and providing one's
own client with a "reality check").
44 The exploration of interests seems to be a relatively common feature of the mediation of envi-
ronmental disputes, the reform of public institutions, and other public policy disputes, which also are the
sorts of cases that are not easily resolved by civil litigation. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 398 (1978) (explaining the value of "knowing when the polycen-
tric elements have become so significant and predominant [in a dispute] that the proper limits of adjudi-
cation have been reached"). Particularly, in environmental mediation, it is common to have a separate
stage in which the mediator conducts a "conflict analysis" and, based on interviews and documents,
reports to the parties regarding "what the conflict is." See Interview with mediator Howard Bellman, in
Dedham, Mass. (June 18, 2006). See also Lawrence E. Susskind, Consensus Building and ADR: Why
They Are Not the Same Thing, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 358, 364 (Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (describing how mediators in the consensus-building process
must identify stakeholders and underlying interests, in contrast to court-connected mediators). It is also
not unusual to invite a broader focus in public policy disputes or cases involving the reform of large
institutions. See id. at 360-61. Mediators may do something similar in other cases by conducting "pre-
mediation" sessions with each side. See JEFFREY KRIVIS, IMPROVISATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A
MEDIATOR'S STORIES OF CONFLICT ABOUT LOVE, MONEY, ANGER-AND THE STRATEGIES THAT
RESOLVED THEM 8-9 (2006) (relaying a story about a post-termination mediation where the mediator
went outside with the former employee to contextualize the problem before setting an agenda that might
prove counterproductive). Another alternative would be including such caucuses in the mediation or
urging the parties to introduce deeper aspects of their conflict in joint sessions. See infra Part II.B.2.
[VOL. 15:4
2008] "THE PROBLEM" IN COURT-ORIENTED MEDIATION
mediation procedures.45 Some courts and private alternative dispute resolu-
tion, or "ADR," providers offer continuing education programs or reflective
practice sessions for their mediators that include discussion of the impor-
tance of exploring underlying interests and non-legal issues in appropriate
cases.46 And at least one court program can point to evaluation results
45 The local rule of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of New York, for example, states
that the mediator:
[H]elps parties articulate their interests and understand those of the other party... [and] me-
diation provides an opportunity to explore a wide range of potential solutions and to address
interests that may be outside the scope of the stated controversy or which could not be ad-
dressed by judicial action. A hallmark of mediation is its capacity to expand traditional set-
tlement discussions and broaden resolution options, often by exploring litigant needs and in-
terests that may be formally independent of the legal issues in controversy.
E.D.N.Y. R. 83.11. The U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California uses similar language,
declaring that the mediator "helps parties articulate their interests and understand those of their oppo-
nent" and that "[a] hallmark of mediation is its capacity to expand traditional settlement discussion and
broaden resolution options, often by exploring litigant needs and interests that may be formally inde-
pendent of the legal issues in controversy." N.D. CAL. ADR R. 6-1. The U.S. District Court of the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania includes the following sentence in its definition of mediation: "Benefits of a
mediated settlement may include reduced cost to the litigants and agreements which serve the underly-
ing interests of the parties." Mediation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, http:/www.pamd.uscourts.gov/docs/mediat.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008). And in the
U.S. District Court of the Western District of Missouri, mediation is defined as "a process in which a
neutral third party assists the parties in developing and exploring their underlying interests (in addition
to their legal positions)." General Order, Western District of Missouri, Early Assessment Program
VII.B.I.a. (Sept. 13, 2007). See also U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Circuit Mediation
Office, Procedures Governing the Circuit Mediation Office 3, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Docu-
ments.nsf (follow "Download by Topic (order by Subject)" hyperlink; then scroll down to "Mediation -
Forms" and follow "Memo re: Procedures Governing the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (directing counsel, prior to the settlement conference, to "discuss with their
clients what the clients believe must be present to achieve a fair settlement, encouraging them to explore
not only their legal positions but also the interests that underlie their positions").
46 For example, staff of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California regularly
facilitate "brown bag" lunches for the program's mediators to provide an opportunity to discuss current
issues and encourage reflective practice. U.S. District Court for the Northern Disctrict of California,
Continuing Education, http://www.adr.cand.uscourts.gov (follow Neutral Education hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008). The Maryland Judiciary's Mediation and Conflict Resolution Office has adopted
a Maryland Program for Mediator Excellence (MPME) that will provide self-reflection opportunities,
case discussion, videotaped assessments, and mentoring to assist mediators in developing their skills.
Mediation and Conflict Resolution Office, Maryland Program for Mediator Excellence, Task Group
Reports, Status Report (Sept. 2005), http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/taskgrouprpts.html. Some
private ADR organizations have also institutionalized opportunities for reflective practice. See, e.g.,
Craig McEwen, Giving Meaning to Mediator Professionalism, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 3, 4-
5 (calling upon mediators to develop "collegial control" over their work and noting that for such "con-
trol to be meaningful, broad identities wit,-, the mediation community must be complemented by per-
sonal contacts that reinforce professional standards and expectations and help practitioners with prob-
lem-solving, reflection and professional growth"); Margaret L. Shaw, Style Schmyle!.: What's Evalua-
tion Got To Do With It?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at 17, 20 (describing regular monthly con-
ference calls held by groups of JAMS mediators). Courts with staff mediators who are in easy and
frequent contact actually may find it easier to develop a shared sense of professional identity. Wayne D.
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showing that the use of underlying interests in mediation sessions was help-
ful. 4
7
Nonetheless, we believe that the majority of court-oriented, non-
family civil mediations employ the same narrow problem definition that
typically prevails in lawyers' negotiations of ordinary cases.48 Most lawyers
continue to prefer that retired judges or experienced litigators with relevant
substantive expertise serve as their mediators.49 Given this preference, it is
not surprising that lawyers are more likely to report that they value media-
Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Con-
cerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 715, 795 (1999) ("[F]ull-time staff-neutrals are likely to have the
greatest ego-investment in the quality of the ADR program. And, other things being equal, the people
with the greatest ego-investment in a program are the people likely to bring the most energy and effort
to their work.").
47 For example, 87% of mediators and 62% of lawyers surveyed about their participation in me-
diations under the ADR Program of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California said
"the mediation had helped the parties identify their underlying interests, needs, and legal priorities
beyond their legal positions." Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of
Civil Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 251-53 (2007).
48 See HERBERT M. KRITzER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 8, at 30; HERBERT M. KRITZER,
THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 8, at 38.
49 See Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on
Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 405-06, 434 (2002) (reporting that
lawyers perceive that the most important qualifications for mediators are "substantive experience in the
field of law related to case" [84.2% of respondents] and "being litigators and lawyers" [66.2%]); James
J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation "?, 19 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 47, 66-71 (1991) (describing new techniques brought into mediation because of the use of legal
professionals as mediators); Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, 82
JUDICATURE 224, 228 (1999) (noting that attorneys prefer mediators who "have courtroom experi-
ence"); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L. REV. 473,
524 tbl.33 (2002) (reporting that 87% of lawyers indicated that a mediator should know how to value a
case and 83% indicated that a mediator should be a litigator); Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does
ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376,
390 (1997) (reporting that the majority of Hennepin County lawyers interviewed wanted lawyers or
litigators as mediators and for them to give their view of settlement ranges); Thomas B. Metzloff et al.,
Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 124-25, 144-
45 (1997) (reporting that almost 78% of attorneys wanted mediators to provide opinions on the merits of
medical malpractice cases and that attorneys highly valued mediators who possessed substantive exper-
tise in medical malpractice); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases:
What We Know From Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 685 (2002).
If the mediators suggested possible settlement options, attorneys felt the mediation process
was more fair than if the mediators did not suggest options.... [I]f the mediators helped the
parties evaluate the merits of the case (by using reality testing, risk analysis, or asking other
questions) or assisted the parties in assessing the value of the case, attorneys viewed the me-
diation process as more fair than if the mediators did not assist in those forms of evaluation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also ROBERT G. HANN & CARL BAAR, EVALUATION OF THE ONTARIO
MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM (RULE 24.1): FINAL REPORT-THE FIRST 23 MONTHS 80 (2001)
(reporting that mediations in which the parties selected the mediator were significantly more likely to
reach complete settlement than mediations in which the mediator was assigned by local court coordina-
tor).
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tion for its potential to settle cases quickly and provide litigation-focused
"reality testing,"50 rather than its creative potential" or its ability to respond
to non-monetary concerns.52 The lawyers, not the clients, dominate the dis-
cussions that take place in most mediation sessions,53 and the defendants do
50 See McAdoo, supra note 49, at 429 (reporting that the top factors motivating lawyers to volun-
tarily choose mediation include saving litigation expenses (67.9%), making settlement more likely
(57.4%), providing a needed reality check for opposing counsel or party (52.2%), and providing a
needed reality check for own client (47.7%)); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 512-13 (reporting
that top factors motivating lawyers to choose mediation are: saving litigation expenses (85%), speeding
settlement (76%), providing a needed reality check for opposing counsel or party (69%), making settle-
ment more likely (69%), helping everyone value the case (69%), and providing a needed reality check
for own client (67%)); DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 187-88 (1997) (reporting
that 80% of attorneys surveyed said that resolving the case quickly was a "very important factor" in
choosing mediation and 16% responded it was a "somewhat important factor"); KEITH SCHILDT ET AL.,
MAJOR CIVIL CASE MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAM: 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT 34 (1994) (reporting that attorney satisfaction with the mediation program is partly due to the
reality check function mediation provides); HEATHER ANDERSON & RON Pi, EVALUATION OF THE
EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAMS 61-62 (2004) (reporting that lawyers' satisfaction with the media-
tion process was moderately or strongly correlated with whether they believed the process was "fair,"
"resulted in a fair/reasonable outcome," and "helped move the case toward resolution quickly" as well
as whether the "mediator treated all parties fairly"; lawyers' satisfaction with mediation outcomes was
correlated with whether they believed the "mediation resulted in a fair/reasonable outcome" and "the
mediation helped move the case toward resolution quickly").
51 See McAdoo, supra note 49, at 429 tbl. 10 (reporting that about 31% of attorneys voluntarily
choose mediation to "[i]ncrease potential for creative solutions"); Metzloff et al., supra note 49, at 151
(noting that during the course of a study involving court-ordered mediation in the malpractice context,
parties rarely considered "creative solutions"); Gordon, supra note 40, at 384. One survey showed that
less than 12% of "plaintiffs settling at a mediated settlement conference received nonmonetary relief."
Id. In contrast, nearly 30% of plaintiffs who opted for adjudication "received some type of nonmonetary
relief." Id; Clarke & Gordon, supra note 40, at 321 (research finding that in North Carolina, mediated
settlement outcomes were indistinguishable from conventional negotiation settlements). But see
Macfarlane, supra note 43, at 272-77 (observing that when parties attend mediation, many lawyers
perceive that the outcomes are changed to reflect the parties' needs and interests).
52 See Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND
TROUBLE CASES 156-66 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (contrasting tort plaintiffs' desire to vindicate
their rights and to use the legal system with lawyers' focus on monetary concerns); Gordon, supra note
40, at 384 ("[M]ost attorneys (56.1%) feel that litigants are not necessarily involved in these suits to
satisfy some sense of justice; instead, they think litigants are concerned about money."); ANDERSON &
PI, supra note 50, at 62 (reporting that in contrast to lawyers, parties' satisfaction with the mediation
process was moderately or strongly associated with "what happened within the mediation process-
whether they felt heard, whether the mediation helped their communication or relationship with the
other party, and whether the cost of mediation was affordable").
53 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 40, at 383 ("[A]ttomeys rather than disputants are unquestionably
the main negotiators in mediated settlement conferences."); Gordon, supra note 49, at 227 (reporting
that in observed mediations, lawyers dominated negotiation, the minority of clients who did "play active
roles" were "supporting rather than starring players," and that three-quarters of responding attorneys
disagreed with the statement, "'Litigants should be the most active participants in mediation, with attor-
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not even attend most personal injury and medical malpractice mediations.54
In addition, settlement-focused caucuses dominate most mediations, rather
than joint sessions designed to promote parties' mutual understanding."
The dominant practice of court-oriented mediation largely reflects the
influence of the repeat players. Its consequence is that some parties-most
neys standing by to offer legal advice."'); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 523 tbl.32 (reporting
that 51% of lawyers perceive that mediators speak primarily with or to the lawyers, but 42% of lawyers
perceive that mediators encourage the clients to speak for themselves); Metzloff et al., supra note 49, at
123-25 (discussing the limited involvement of plaintiffs and defendants during medical malpractice
mediation sessions); Wissler, supra note 49, at 658 (when comparing mediators' ratings of the amount
of time the parties and lawyers in the same case talked during the session, the lawyers spent more time
talking than the parties in 63% of the cases; in 6%, the parties spent more time talking, and in 31%, the
parties and lawyers spent about the same time talking). But see McAdoo, supra note 49, at 435 tbl.14
(reporting that nearly 80% of attorneys perceive that mediators always or frequently encourage clients to
participate in the mediation process).
54 See Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 445, 456-59 (2007)
(observing that data from various studies of Toronto-based mediation centers showed that lawyers rarely
invited defendant doctors to attend mediation sessions); Press, supra note 37, at 62 (reporting anecdotal
evidence that parties increasingly do not attend mediation sessions in Florida); Metzloff et al., supra
note 49, at 109, 124-25 (stating that defendant physicians "were absent with some degree of frequency"
in "a major empirical study conducted on the use of court-ordered mediation in the North Carolina court
system"). But see Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court Is In Session: What Judges Say About Court-
Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 377, 398-99 tbl.8 (2007) (observing that one of
the top reasons that judges order cases to mediation is because they believe the process "gets clients
directly involved in discussions").
55 See Gordon, supra note 49, at 379, 382 ("Observations suggest that mediation conferences
typically involve extensive caucusing, a structure that supports bargaining rather than open information
exchange or direct communication between the parties."); Deborah R. Hensler, A Research Agenda:
What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 17 ("After
initial presentation of the dispute, evaluative mediators appear to move quickly to 'shuttle diplomacy.'
Parties may not meet together again until an agreement has been struck .. "); McAdoo, supra note 49,
at 435 tbl.14 (reporting that approximately 73% of attorneys perceive that mediators always or fre-
quently use caucuses effectively and approximately 49% of attorneys perceive that mediators always or
frequently ask each side to present an opening statement); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 523
tbl.32 (reporting that approximately 62% of lawyers perceive that mediators use caucuses almost exclu-
sively but approximately 3% of lawyers perceive that mediators use joint session almost exclusively;
also reporting that about 85% of lawyers indicated that mediators ask each side to present an opening
statement in joint session); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 49, at 391 (reporting that when twenty-three
civil litigators throughout Minnesota were interviewed, several "observed that opening statements could
promote unproductive adversarial posturing and thus should not be part of the typical mediation");
Metzloff et al., supra note 49, at 119 (describing the structure of mediation sessions, which typically
involve a series of private caucuses). See also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 638 & n.313 (1997) (raising concerns
about the absence of the right to present evidence in ADR proceedings and that a disputant may be
"essentially silenced by a biased or rushed mediator"). See generally Alfini, supra note 49, at 66-73
(reporting that "trashers" discourage direct party communication and quickly move to caucuses as
opposed to "bashers" who focus on initial settlements offers "and spend most of the session bashing
away at those initial offers" and "hashers" who "adopt a style that encourages direct party communica-
tion to hash out an agreement" but may borrow from other styles).
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commonly the one-shot, individual players involved in ordinary cases-
miss opportunities for dialogue and outcomes that would better suit their
needs.
A. An Example: The Sabia Damages Case
A poignant example of the common mediation practices in ordinary
cases that we have been describing comes from Barry Werth's Damages:
One Family's Legal Struggles in the World of Medicine,56 an in-depth study
of a medical malpractice case that has been required reading in courses at a
number of law schools. 7 We use this case because it is familiar and well-
documented, and Werth describes the mediation sessions in some detail.
The mediations fall within the category of court-oriented mediation, but
they were conducted privately, not as part of any court-connected pro-
gram.5
8
In April, 1984, Donna Sabia gave birth to twins at Norwalk Hospital in
Norwalk, Connecticut.5 9 One child was stillborn; the other, who came to be
known as "Little Tony," was born brain damaged and so severely compro-
mised that he would never be able to walk, talk, or care for himself in any
way.6" He would require extensive medical and nursing care for his entire
life. Donna and Tony, her husband, worked heroically to care for Little
Tony." They suffered both economically and emotionally, struggling to
provide their son with the care he needed.62
Three years after Little Tony's birth, the Koskoff law firm-perhaps
the leading plaintiffs medical malpractice firm in Connecticut 63-filed suit
in Superior Court on behalf of Donna and Little Tony against Norwalk
56 BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE
(1998).
57 The schools that require the reading of Damages include the University of Missouri-Columbia,
the University of Connecticut, and William Mitchell College of Law. Melody Richardson Daily, Chris
Guthrie & Leonard L. Riskin, Damages: Using a Case Study to Teach Law, Lawyering, and Dispute
Resolution, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 9 n.42. For an essay on how to use this book in law school teaching,
see Tom Baker, Teaching Real Torts: Using Barry Werth 's Damages in the Law School Classroom, 2
NEV. L.J. 386, 386-87 (2002). In addition, Professor Bruce Hay at Harvard Law School has used it in
Civil Procedure. E-mail from Bruce Hay, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Leonard Riskin
(Oct. 5, 2007) (on file with author), and Professor Dom Vetri of the University of Oregon School of
Law uses the book in his Torts course and in a Personal Injury seminar. E-mail from Professor Dom
Vetri, B.A. Klicks Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law, to Leonard Riskin (Aug. 4,
2007) (on file with author).
58 WERTH, supra note 56, at 298.
59 Id. at 16.
60 See id. at 19, 25, 31-33.
61 See id. at 31-33.
62 See id.
63 Id. at41.
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Hospital and Maryellen Humes, M.D. 64 Dr. Humes, an obstetrician-
gynecologist, had never seen Donna before being called in to perform the
delivery. 65 The complaint alleged numerous acts of negligence involving
both nonfeasance and misfeasance.66 In reality, neither side was quite clear
about what produced Little Tony's condition, or whether the hospital or Dr.
Humes caused it or could have prevented it.67
The lawyers engaged in settlement negotiations throughout the course
of the litigation. In April 1991, the Sabias' lawyers demanded a total of $15
million to settle the claims against the hospital and Dr. Humes . 6' The hospi-
tal's insurance company, Travelers, offered $5 million, which the Sabias
declined.69 In February 1992, under pressure from her insurance company,
Dr. Humes settled for $1.35 million.7" The hospital then remained as the
only defendant.7
While a trial was in sight, Donna and Tony7 2 Sabia hoped for vindica-
tion, some recognition of the injury that they and their son had suffered,73
and an end to the emotional turmoil and sense of desperation that had en-
gulfed them.74 Instead of trial, though, their case went to private, voluntary
mediation-twice.75 The lawyers on each side entered into the process an-
ticipating that mediation would encourage the other side to moderate its
64 WERTH, supra note 56, at 65-66. Although the older Tony was not a plaintiff, he played a
central role in the litigation, negotiation, and mediation of the case. Therefore, we treat him as a party in
our discussion.
65 Id. at 17-18.
66 The complaint alleged that the hospital was negligent in not treating Donna's pregnancy as high
risk, not having adequate procedures for twin pregnancies, and failing to follow even the procedures it
did have in place. Id. at 66. It also alleged that the hospital was negligent in providing nurse-midwives
rather than physicians, ignoring the fact that the fetal heartbeat was not audible on admission, delaying
the ultrasound and C-section, and not arranging for an obstetrician to attend to Donna as soon as she
arrived at the hospital. Id. The claim against Dr. Humes asserted that she failed to meet the appropriate
medical standard of care in not examining Donna earlier and not delivering the twins by C-section
immediately after an ultrasound. Id.
67 Dr. Humes also suffered greatly, working to defend her reputation and maintain malpractice
insurance coverage. Id. at 75.
68 WERTH, supra note 56, at 186-87.
69 Id. at 187.
70 Id. at 209-12.
71 Jd. at211.
72 Though Tony Sabia was not a party to the lawsuit, id. at 65, he played a major role in the plain-
tiffs' case and decision-making, e.g., id. at 359 (discussing with Donna whether to settle).
73 WERTH, supra note 56, at 298. See also Hensler, supra note 52, at 157-158 (describing tort and
medical malpractice plaintiffs' desires in pursuing litigation).
74 WERTH, supra note 56, at 31.
75 Id. at 310-25 (describing the first mediation); id. at 356-63 (describing the second mediation).
For extensive analyses of these mediations, see generally Leonard L. Riskin, Teaching and Learning
from the Mediations in Barry Werth's Damages, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 119.
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expectations76 and thus enable the parties to reach a monetary settlement."
Donna and Tony sought a financial resolution, particularly because they
needed a good deal of money to provide around-the-clock care for Little
Tony." But they also wanted something more, and different. They likely
felt a need to understand what had caused Little Tony's terrible condition.79
They wanted recognition and acknowledgment of how they had suffered
and how well they had coped."0 Neither of the mediations fulfilled these
interests. "I
From the very beginning, the Sabias' participation in mediation was
severely limited. At the first mediation, Tony, Donna, and Little Tony left
the mediation room after they were introduced to the lawyers, the insurance
company representatives, and the mediator.8" Donna and Tony participated
only in the private caucuses with their lawyers and the mediator.8 3 The case
did not settle. 4 In the second mediation, Tony insisted that he and Donna
76 See McAdoo, supra note 49, at 429 (reporting that one of the top factors motivating lawyers to
choose mediation voluntarily was providing a needed reality check for opposing counsel or party
(52.2%)); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 513 tbl.25 (reporting that one of the top factors moti-
vating lawyers to choose mediation was providing a needed reality check for opposing counsel or party
(69%)).
77 WERTH, supra note 56, at 365.
78 Id. at 251, 319-20.
79 See id. at 311. See also STEPHEN L. FIELDING, THE PRACTICE OF UNCERTAINTY 107-09 (1999)
(summarizing research that indicates that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases want to learn the truth
about what happened and that learning what happened and holding a provider accountable are important
steps in the emotional healing process for plaintiffs); Stephen L. Fielding, Changing Medical Practice
and Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 SOC. PROBS. 38, 50-51 (1995) (observing that a group of plaintiffs
from Massachusetts and New York, when asked why they sued, stated that "they sued, not just for the
money, but because they wanted to learn the truth"). But see Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED.
ASs'N 1359, 1361 (1992) ("The most frequently reported reason families filed was that they had been
advised or influenced to sue by someone outside the immediate family (33% of the sample) .... [The
second most mentioned reason for suing (24%)] was that they needed money to pay for long-term
care."). See generally Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors?: How Patients
Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105, 116 (1990) (finding that patients who sue are
more likely to question their doctors' competence prior to their injury and perceive that their doctors
failed to show care for them personally).
80 WERTH, supra note 56, at 359-60. Professors Bush and Folger have written most extensively
about "recognition" in the "transformative" approach to mediation that they developed. See BUSH &
FOLGER, supra note 32, at 84-99. But even academics and mediators who do not promote or practice
transformative mediation emphasize the importance of recognition. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping
Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized
Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 665 (2004) (discussing how parents
involved in a mediation with school officials appreciate the aspects of mediation that enhance their
voice and the respect officials are likely to show them as a result).
81 WERTH, supra note 56, at 365.
82 ld at 314-15.
83 Id. at 314.
84 Id. at 324-25.
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be present in the joint session.85 The Sabias' lawyer, Michael Koskoff,
agreed, but only on the condition that (in Werth's words) they "held their
questions until the end." 6 Koskoff was worried that Tony would lose con-
trol. 87 His apprehension proved to be justified. Well before the end of the
mediation, Tony exploded at Bill Doyle, the lead defense counsel.88 Ac-
cording to Werth, Tony "wanted [the defense lawyers] to concede that he,
Tony, had taken all the world could throw at him, and was still standing. He
wanted respect."89 Tony particularly sought recognition from Doyle. He
believed, incorrectly, that Doyle could not possibly understand or empa-
thize with the Sabias' situation."
Doyle's presentation concentrated on legal argument,9 which must
have only confirmed Tony's perception of the gulf between them. Ironi-
cally, Doyle could understand Tony's predicament. He had grown up with a
sibling who needed extensive care. 9 Years later, Doyle said that he had felt
he could not afford to allow himself to feel or express empathy toward
Tony because that would have interfered with his ability to represent his
client. 9'
After Tony's explosion (or cry for recognition, depending on one's
point of view) the co-mediators "threw everyone out" of the room and be-
gan to caucus with each other.94 They wanted to discuss what they consid-
ered the "key issue"-causation.95 Eventually, the second mediation pro-
duced a settlement with the hospital for $6.25 million. 96 This resolution,
combined with the earlier settlement with Dr. Humes and Tony's hard
work, gave the Sabias enough money to support Little Tony and keep their
family together. 97 But it also left them in a raw, emotional state, feeling
confused and victimized by their son's disability and by the mediation it-
self9 8 Donna and Tony were angry, in part because the mediations totally
85 Id. at 356-57.
86 Id. at 357.
87 WERTH, supra note 56, at 357.
" Id. at 359-60.
89 Id. at 359-60.
90 See id. at 359-60.
91 Id. at 358-59.
92 Id. at 315.
93 Interview by Leonard Riskin with William Doyle, in Columbia, Mo. (Apr. 11, 2003). Tony
learned about Doyle's family history only when he read Werth's book about this case, which, ironically,
gave him the recognition he thought he would get from his lawsuit or mediation. Id.
94 WERTH, supra note 56, at 360.
95 Id. at 360. See also Riskin, supra note 75, at 139 (observing that "[v]irtually any book on me-
diation and nearly any mediation training program would say that, at a minimum, the mediator should
have used 'active listening,' i.e., paraphrased the content and named the emotions connected with
Tony's outburst.").
96 WERTH, supra note 56, at 365-67.
97 Id. at371-75.
98 Id. at 369.
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ignored their interests in learning what really happened to their son and in
gaining respect and acknowledgement for what they had gone through and
how well they had performed.99
One way to understand what happened in this mediation is through a
framework described by Professor Bernard Mayer. He suggests exploring
conflict along three dimensions-behavioral, cognitive, and emotional-
and argues that full resolution requires resolution along all three dimen-
sions. '00 All the participants in the Sabias' case achieved behavioral resolu-
tion in the sense that they stopped contesting this case. On the cognitive
dimension, which addresses how the parties understand what happened and
how they understand their settlement,' most of the repeat players achieved
resolution even though no one really understood what led to Little Tony's
disabilities. In author Barry Werth's words:
The question of exactly what Travelers had paid for remained unresolved. Koskoff believed
absolutely it was for Norwalk Hospital's negligence in causing Little Tony's brain damage in
1984. Travelers and Doyle just as vehemently thought the insurer had paid in order to avoid
paying much more if a jury agreed with Koskoff.1
02
Thus, the plaintiffs' lawyers understood the settlement as an admission
of liability. The defendant and its insurer and lawyer understood the settle-
ment as risk management. Despite the repeat players' differing interpreta-
tions of the agreement, it resulted from and accorded with conventional
practices and valuation schema that they generally understood and ac-
cepted; in other words, they seemed cognitively content with "knowing"
what happened in the limited sense that they could make, and believe, ad-
versarial arguments about what happened.' 3 The behavioral and cognitive
99 Id. at 359.
100 BERNARD S. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
41-46 (2000).
101 Seeid. at98-100.
102 WERTH, supra note 56, at 370.
103 Michael Koskoff believes that the discovery process did produce an understanding of the events
that led to Little Tony's disabilities. Koskoff has written:
Unfortunately, I also never believed that the mediation process would give the Sabias 'the
answers' they sought; though I do believe, through the discovery process and investigation,
we were able to arrive at a thorough understanding of what happened to Little Tony and why
it happened. Most of the time I spent on this case was addressed to finding the answers to
those questions. I'm convinced that I did find the answers and communicated them to the
Sabias. I recognize that this communication is not a complete substitute for a formal finding
by a tribunal or an admission by an adversary under cross examination. However, the expla-
nation was thorough and, in my view, convincing. I also recognize that Bill Doyle feels he
has a different answer to what happened and that Barry [Werth] feels that the whole thing is
unknowable.
Letter from Michael P. Koskoff, Partner, Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, PC, to Leonard Riskin (Feb. 8,
2008) (on file with the authors).
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resolutions that the repeat players achieved also enabled emotional resolu-
tion, at least for most of them. "
In contrast, the Sabias never achieved cognitive comfort with the fact
that they did not learn what really happened to Little Tony or why.'5 As a
result, these one-shot players also did not achieve emotional resolution.
After the settlement, which happened to occur on Christmas Eve, the Sabias
thanked their lawyers, but:
[T]hey were too conflicted to be settled .... You mean I'm going to walk out of here with a
check and that's going to be it? Is that all it means?" Tony asked, his voice steeped in re-
morse. Already he was "kicking [him]self in the ass, because [he] watched that guy [Doyle]
agree with everything Michael [Koskoff] said." They had gotten it over with, Donna would
say, but for what purpose, and at what price, she and Tony still didn't know. 1
0 6
The essential reason that neither mediation provided Tony and Donna
with the knowledge, respect and acknowledgment that they sought-which
might have enabled them to achieve cognitive and emotional resolution-is
that none of the professionals considered these goals to be an appropriate
part of the mediation process. '07 Instead, the lawyers, insurance adjusters,
and mediators adopted a narrow problem definition: What monetary result
would a trial produce, and what financial and other costs would the parties
incur before completing a trial?' °5 What kind of financial settlement was
feasible for both sides? For the repeat players in the room, the only infor-
mation that seemed relevant was that which would bear on these ques-
tions.' °9 To them, procedures that excluded other sorts of information
104 At least one lawyer on the defense side, though, did not reach cognitive resolution or emotional
resolution. Werth observed that "[u]nlike Doyle, [Beverly Hunt had] been unable to put her identifica-
tion with her client aside, and the mediations had proved unsupportable-'the most castrating experi-
ence of my life,' she calls them." WERTH, supra note 56, at 368.
105 Idat310-11.
106 Id. at 369. Other books also describe plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with processes that produce
monetary settlements but do not respond to other psychological and emotional needs. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 452-454 (1995); GERALD M. STERN, BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER
272 (1976). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1015-
23 (1999) (observing that apologies provide a variety of benefits to injured parties, but also can benefit
offenders).
107 It likely was impossible for them to have gotten an accurate understanding of what actually
caused Little Tony's injuries. In our view, no one actually knew the cause, though the lawyers on both
sides, of course, argued as if they did.
108 Arguably, this focus is consistent with a desire to emulate the form of substantive justice pro-
duced by trial. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 409. But the repeat players' task orientation
ignores another important product of trials-perceptions of procedural justice with all of its important
consequences for perceptions of substantive justice and legitimacy, as well as compliance. See Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH U.
L.Q. 787, 817-20 (2001).
109 See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded
Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1327-30 (1998).
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seemed appropriate."' The definition of "the problem" could have been
different, and we turn to that now.
B. Finding the Most Appropriate Problem Definition in the Sabia
Mediations
In this section, we illustrate in more detail how the mediations failed to
give the Sabias some of what they thought they needed and how the media-
tions might have been structured to respond to such needs. We do not claim
that Donna and Tony would necessarily have been better off with such ad-
justments, though we believe they would have been happier with the proc-
ess and outcome."'
The following discussion will be clearer if we explain how we are us-
ing three common terms: positions, interests, and issues. A position is es-
sentially a statement, demand, or want. "2 When plaintiffs' lawyer Michael
Koskoff demanded multiple millions of dollars on behalf of his clients, he
was asserting a position. An interest is a need or goal that motivates some-
one to assert a position." 3 In the Sabias' case, that positional claim for
money was meant to serve a number of interests, including Tony's and
Donna's interest in supporting Little Tony and their family. But it was not
110 Michael Koskoff recently described his goal for the mediation:
In my experience, mediations in these types of cases do not achieve the "catharsis" provided
by jury trials. I never felt it would or could achieve emotional satisfaction for the Sabias, or
their attorneys for that matter. What the Sabias really wanted, on some level, was for the
hospital to suffer, as Tony and Donna had. They also wanted formal acknowledgement that
they had been wronged. They did not achieve those goals.
From our perspective, the Sabia mediation had, as its only goal, the quest for a monetary set-
tlement. I believe that their active participation in the mediation process would have been
counter-productive to that goal. They would have heard arguments from the defense that
would have left them, not only unsatisfied, but angrier than when they started. From Bill
Doyle's perspective, he had to make those arguments to convince us and the Sabias of the
weaknesses in the case.
In the end, the Sabia's came away from the process not fully satisfied, but not fully unsatis-
fied either. They live, now, in relative comfort as opposed to abject poverty; and, on a daily
basis, are satisfied that they are able to provide a decent and healthy life for their son. I don't
believe that the mediation failures you enumerate affect them on an ongoing basis. I view the
mediation as a success. An apt metaphor for this experience is childbirth. For a mother,
"natural" childbirth may be the most satisfying experience and a C-section the least satisfy-
ing. However, the overriding goal is the healthy baby. No mother would want to risk the
baby for a satisfying experience. Regardless of how unsatisfying the experience of the C-
section may be, to a mother with a healthy baby, it is of little consequence.
Letter from Michael Koskoff, Partner, Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, PC, to Leonard Riskin (Feb. 8, 2008)
(on file with authors).
I11 We humbly acknowledge the burgeoning body of research suggesting that people are not very
good at predicting what will make them happy in the future. See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS 89-95 (2006); Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation,
87 MARQ. L. REV. 817, 818-20 (2004).
112 SeeFISHERETAL.,supranote3, at4.
113 Id. at42.
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intended to serve some of their other interests, such as knowing what really
happened to cause their son's disability and receiving recognition from oth-
ers of how well they had performed in tragic and challenging circum-
stances." 4 An issue, in this context, is a question that could be included as
part of the subject matter or problem definition in a dispute resolution pro-
cedure. For example, and as we illustrate more fully below, in the negotia-
tion to settle a case such as this one, the focus could be on litigation issues,
business or other economic issues, personal "core" issues, or community
issues. If the problem definition is limited to litigation and economic issues,
then the procedures adopted may allow no room for other issues.
1. The Problem Definition Continuum
The "problem definition" or subject matter of a mediation is depicted
in Figure 1 along a continuum running from narrow to broad."' A narrow
focus means that one or a small number of issues will be relevant." 6 A
broad problem definition permits the inclusion of a diverse array of issues
and typically allows more readily for the mediation to focus explicitly on
underlying interests." 7 The particular sequencing of potential issues along
the continuum usually is affected by the context within which the mediation
occurs. In other words, the context helps to determine which set of issues
the participants are most likely to view as central or peripheral to dispute
resolution and decision-making. As we will explain more fully below, the
Sabia mediations focused primarily on Point I: Litigation Issues, and, at
least implicitly, on Point II: Business/Economic Issues; this is the usual
focus in the "ordinary" non-family civil mediations we are discussing. The
mediations gave no attention to Point III: Core Issues or Point IV: Commu-
nity Issues. Each point on the problem definition continuum may offer op-
portunities for addressing any of Mayer's dimensions of conflict-
behavioral, cognitive, and emotional '--depending on the circumstances of
the case and the needs of the participants." 9
114 We are distinguishing here between recognition of the harm that their son had suffered-which
arguably was acknowledged through the provision of monetary compensation-and recognition of his
parents' heroic efforts to manage their lives.
115 This is a modified version of previously published graphic depictions of the Problem-
Definition Continuum. Riskin, supra note 32, at 22.
116 Id. at 18-22.
117 Id.
118 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
119 See MAYER, supra note 100.
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Copyright 02008 Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh
(1) Litigation Issues: The principal, explicit focus in the Sabia media-
tions was litigation issues. In the parenthetical accompanying that point
within Figure 1 above, the symbols "M, Ds, Ls" indicate that the repeat
players-mediators, defendants (particularly the representatives of the in-
surance company), and lawyers- thought that this was the appropriate
focus. 120
(2) "Business "/Economic Issues: Economic impacts influence the de-
velopment of law in general, the assessment of damages in particular cases,
and parties' negotiating options. Therefore, regardless of the extent to
which parties explicitly raised these issues in the mediation sessions, it is
very likely that they had a significant indirect influence upon both the hos-
pital's offers and the Sabias' demands. For example, the Sabias were deal-
ing with serious economic needs in order to support Little Tony and main-
tain a reasonable standard of living for their family.12" ' The Sabias' eco-
nomic instability likely affected their ability to choose freely between set-
tling their lawsuit and waiting for a fully responsive resolution.
Defense attorney Doyle tried to satisfy what he assumed to be the
plaintiffs' interests. His first offer was a structured settlement of $1.7 mil-
lion, with an initial payment of $700,000 and $1,000,000 invested in annui-
120 See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 631, 645-46 (1980-81) (observing that whatever harm or
dispute a party brings to a professional, the professional will transform the harm or dispute so that the
professional's expertise is appropriate for its resolution).
121 WERTH, supra note 56, at 367.
20081
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ties that would yield $60,000 per year for Little Tony's lifetime.'22 In addi-
tion, Travelers offered to pay $12,500 each year for four years for college
tuition for the Sabias' other two children (not realizing that they had three
other children). 123
Of course, the hospital and its insurer, Travelers, also sought to protect
their own economic and business interests. The hospital's lawyers and other
representatives, for example, had to consider the financial, personnel, and
future business risks presented by the case, as well as how any resolution
would affect their reputation and ability to manage their services and avoid
or discourage litigation. Norwalk Hospital had recently opened a state-of-
the-art Maternity Center and was promoting high-risk obstetrics as a major
attraction and income-producer. 124 It now had the facilities and staff that
"almost certainly would have saved"' 125 Little Tony. A trial could have gen-
erated publicity that would have scared pregnant women away from the
hospital. 126 An out of court settlement, in contrast, could be kept private. 27
These issues likely were incorporated, implicitly or explicitly, into the sub-
ject matter of the mediation session.
(3) Personal "Core" Issues: Core issues, as we use the term, are based
on the five "core concerns" that Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro tell us are
shared by all negotiators.'28 The five "core concerns"-which, for our pur-
poses, are essentially psychological and relational interests 29-are auton-
omy, affiliation, appreciation, status, and role. 3 ' Everyone wants to have
122 id.
123 ld. at318-19.
124 Id. at 368.
125 id.
126 id.
127 WERTH, supra note 56, at 368.
128 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS You NEGOTIATE
15(2005).
129 We must note that Daniel Shapiro is somewhat wary about using the terms interchangeably. He
explains:
Some people have described the core concerns as core interests, and I think it could make
sense. From my own perspective, however, the word "concerns" calls forth a more emotional
sense, whereas "interests" seems a bit more business-like/political in its historical use and na-
ture .... An unmet concern... can be seen clearly to trigger an action tendency (and con-
comitant emotion). An interest (at least in terminology) seems to be a bit less intrinsically
emotionally charged.
E-mail from Daniel Shapiro, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, to Leonard Riskin (June 10, 2007)
(on file with author).
130 We do not mean to argue that Fisher and Shapiro have exhausted the realm of emotions in
negotiation. Other commentators have taken different perspectives on the role of emotions in negotia-
tion. See infra note 215 and sources cited therein. We also do not mean to suggest that emotional inter-
ests are the only or invariably the most important interests. We use the five core concerns because they
help simplify and thus bring a certain clarity to the analysis. As George Box said, "All models are
wrong[,] but some are useful." G.E.P. Box, Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building, in
ROBUSTNESS IN STATISTICS 201, 202 (Robert L. Launer & Graham N. Wilkinson eds., 1979). We find
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freedom to decide matters that are important to them (autonomy), to feel
connected to others (affiliation), to have others acknowledge the merit of
their thoughts, feelings, and actions (appreciation), to receive full recogni-
tion of their standing (status), and to have a fulfilling role.'31 Core concerns
and emotions are directly related. Satisfaction of one's core concerns tends
to promote positive emotions. Failure to satisfy one's core concerns tends to
promote negative emotions. For the many negotiators who find it over-
whelming to deal with the multiple, interacting, and constantly-changing
emotions that occur during a negotiation, Fisher and Shapiro urge attention
to the more limited number of core concerns that give rise to most emo-
tions.'32
Ideally a skilled and experienced mediator should be able to discern
and respond appropriately to parties' emotions. In reality, however, many
mediators are either not inclined or not sufficiently skillful to rise to that
challenge.'33 If the problem definition of a mediation includes core issues,
however, then the process should make explicit room for addressing the
parties' core concerns and resulting emotions. This should enable more
effective and collaborative negotiation within the mediation and also foster
emotional resolution.
For Donna and Tony, core concerns likely arose in connection with
both the injury to Little Tony and its effects ("life/dispute-related core con-
cers"), on the one hand, and the actual mediations ("mediation-related core
concerns"), on the other. The life/dispute-related core concerns included
autonomy, in the sense of their ability to choose how they would function as
an independent and self-sufficient family unit, and affiliation, their ability
to feel connected as a family and as a part of the larger community. They
clearly thought that the situation made it extraordinarily difficult to play the
role of parent and provider and wanted others to appreciate the enormity of
what they had endured and how valiantly they had performed.'34 They may
also have felt that the situation threatened their social status as a normal and
self-sufficient family. The Sabias' desire to know what actually caused Lit-
tle Tony's injuries-and whether the tragedy might have been avoided-
could have drawn on any number of core concerns, especially autonomy. "
this one especially useful even though it may not readily accommodate all emotions or include certain
kinds of interests.
131 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 16.
132 Id. at 12-14.
133 See id. at 12 (stating that dealing directly with every emotion as it happens is daunting for
trained psychologists and psychiatrists).
134 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
135 See FIELDING, supra note 79, at 107-09 (summarizing research that indicates that plaintiffs in
medical cases want to learn the truth about what happened and that learning what happened and holding
a provider accountable are important steps in the emotional healing process for plaintiffs); Mark S.
Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: Two Decades of
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All of this produced a good deal of anger, despair, fear, and other negative
emotions. The Sabias brought these concerns about their life situation, and
the accompanying emotions, into the mediations. In addition, the same core
concerns arose in connection with the mediation processes themselves. As
we will show below, the repeat players largely ignored their concerns for
appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role in the mediation proc-
esses.
In both mediations, the operational problem definition focused explic-
itly on the litigation issues, and implicitly or indirectly on related economic
issues. In other words, the mediations reflected a "normative framing" '36
based on the application of litigation standards. This framing certainly met
the expectations of the repeat players. And since this was a court-oriented
mediation and the courts are responsible for upholding legal standards, one
could argue that such a "norm-advocating" mediation 37 was entirely appro-
priate. But the Sabias-the one-shot players affected most directly and per-
sonally by Little Tony's disability and the parties least able to afford to wait
for trial-wanted the mediation to acknowledge their life/dispute-related
core concerns as well. This did not happen.
The outcome of the settlement, however, did address some of their
life/dispute-related core concerns. By providing a substantial amount of
money, the settlement helped address part of their core concern for auton-
omy in their lives. It may also have responded to part of their core concerns
of role (as parents and providers) and affiliation (having the resources to
keep their family together). But the settlement failed to respond to their
autonomy-related desire to know what really happened to their son and why
they now faced dramatic life changes that they had not chosen.'38
The mediation processes failed to consider the Sabias' mediation-
related core concerns. The procedural choices made by the lawyers and
(apparently) not questioned by the mediators-that Donna and Tony would
not attend or speak in most of the joint sessions, and that they would have
no role in deciding upon procedures or subjects of discussion for the media-
tion-ignored their mediation-related core concerns of autonomy, status,
and role. '39 This limited participation also restricted their opportunities to
receive the appreciation of others, though the defense apparently decided
not to make such expressions in any event."0
Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 30 (2001) (victim-offender mediation has high satisfaction rates for
the victims, partly because of sharing between victim and offender regarding why the crime occurred).
136 Welsh, supra note 80, at 667-69 (contrasting the "different, yet equally legitimate, normative
frames" used by parents and school officials in special education mediation).
137 See Waldman, supra note 32, at 742-45 (providing an example of the norm-advocating model).
138 See supra notes 78-79, 98-99 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. The mediations also did not include other people
who suffered as a result of the injuries to Little Tony, such as Dr. Maryellen Humes, whose insurance
carrier pushed her into a settlement, and two nurses, Barbara McManamy and Mollie Fortuna, who were
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In stark contrast, the mediations were structured to address the core
concerns of the repeat players, particularly the lawyers, both within and
outside the mediation. Most law students and lawyers prefer to be domi-
nant '4 and naturally tend to make decisions based on the application of
rules and standards, rather than values or impacts that are more nebulous.'42
Most lawyers also prefer to avoid emotional issues, their own or others,'43
and place great importance on financial remuneration.'" The restricted
problem definition we have described, therefore, is likely to have matched
the lawyers' own psychological and professional tendencies. The lawyers
involved in the delivery. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing Humes). See also
WERTH, supra note 56, at 129-38 (discussing McManamy and Fortuna). They might have benefited
emotionally from an opportunity to openly discuss the events with the Sabias.
141 See generally Daicoff, supra note 35, at 1407 (observing dominant attributes in law students
and lawyers). Research has found that law students tend to come from elite socioeconomic backgrounds,
which might explain the need for dominance and expectation/protection of privilege. Id. at 1354-55. See
also Ronit Dinovitzer et al., After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal Careers 20 (2004),
http://www.nalpfoundation.org/webmodules/articles/articlefiles/87-AfterJD 2004_ web.pdf (observing
that the newly admitted lawyers in its study "come generally from relatively privileged socioeconomic
backgrounds" though "[flully 21% of respondents' fathers and 28% of respondents' mothers did not
attend college; 15% of the fathers had blue-collar occupations, and 15% of respondents' parents were
born outside the United States.... The more selective the law school, the more likely it is to educate the
children of relative privilege, and the less selective schools are notably more accessible to the less privi-
leged students."). Interestingly, research has also shown that high LSAT scores are highly correlated
with factors such as socioeconomic status and even zip code. See Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or
Institutional Self Interest? 10 Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSA T (and Why Other Good
Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 601-02 (2001) (discussing the correlation
between standardized test scores and economic status).
142 See Daicoff, supra note 35, at 1365-66 (comparing male college students who make decisions
based on values to law students who make decisions based on logical thinking); Vernellia R. Randall,
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 92
(1995-1996) (noting that 77.9% of first-year law students surveyed in one study prefer making decisions
through thinking rather than feeling); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations:
Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 737, 739-40 (1988) (ob-
serving that while clients in their dealings with lawyers interpret events "in terms of their impact on the
self," lawyers are more likely to consider "technical rules and a problem-solving orientation ... [as]
more important than emotional reactions and justifications of self'). Recent research also suggests that
law students (and perhaps lawyers) rank collaboration, which requires both high empathy and high
assertiveness, as their least preferred conflict strategy. Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbermolt,
What If the Lawyers Have Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 277, 306-07 (2007).
143 See Daicoff, supra note 35, at 1349. A 1960 study found that law students' early childhoods
were characterized by authoritarian male dominance, self-discipline, school achievement, and reading.
Id. at 1350. See also LAWRENCE S. KRIEGER, THE HIDDEN SOURCES OF LAW SCHOOL STRESS:
AVOIDING THE MISTAKES THAT CREATE UNHAPPY AND UNPROFESSIONAL LAWYERS 9-10 (2006),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/academicprograms/humanizinglawschoolibooklet.html.
144 See Daicoff, supra note 35, at 1360-62. But see Adam Neufeld, Costs of an Outdated Peda-
gogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 511 (2005)
(reporting a study showing women in law school were more likely to identify altruism as a priority in
choosing a career and also more likely to choose public interest jobs).
GEO. MASON L. REv.
were able to play dominant roles and exercise the autonomy to which they
were accustomed-and which they apparently preferred.145 In addition, all
concerned had to appreciate the lawyers' status and expertise in law. This
could lead to more legal work for the lawyers, which would foster all of
their life-related core concerns. The processes similarly accommodated
some of the mediators' core concerns (e.g., status, role, and autonomy). In
the first mediation, for example, the mediator had enough autonomy to re-
fuse to make predictions about what would happen in court.146 Similarly, it
seems that the narrow focus of these mediations met many of the core inter-
ests of the insurance company and its claims representatives, whose role
was to manage the financial and precedential risk posed by the Sabias' law-
suit. 147
(4) Community Issues: Community issues involve the intersection be-
tween the individual dispute and the interests of the wider community. Such
issues do not generally arise in the court-oriented mediations that are the
focus of our article, in part because the persons or entities that would raise
them are rarely parties. These individual lawsuits focus on individual rights.
Nonetheless, the Sabias might have wanted to raise such issues had they
understood that they could have done so. For example, medical malpractice
plaintiffs will sometimes advocate for changes in health care providers'
policies or practices to prevent similar injuries to future patients.148 The
Sabias might have welcomed the opportunity to hear about the changes the
hospital had made to provide better pre- and post-natal care.149 They may
have had ideas for changes that would have been especially helpful for
families like theirs.
In light of all of the repeat players' important core concerns described
above, it should not be surprising that they would expect court-oriented
mediation to operate within the procedural and substantive "shadow of the
145 See Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in Moffitt & Bordone, supra
note 44, at 494 & nn.64-68 (citing A. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); R. DINGWALL & P. LEWIS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS:
LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS (1983); G.L. GEISON, PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES
IN AMERICA (1983); M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977);
J. Birkhoff, Mediators' Perspectives on Power., A Window into a Profession? (2000) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, George Mason University)).
146 WERTH, supra note 56, at 82, 182.
147 Id. at 126.
148 Relis, supra note 54, at 481.
149 Generally speaking, if such information was presented at a mediation and the case then failed to
settle, the plaintiffs could seek to obtain the same information through pretrial discovery and then have
it admitted as supporting the claim of negligence. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, § 4(c) and Reporters'
Comments, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/uma2OOl.pdf. For this rea-
son, defendants likely would have been unwilling to reveal the information about changes at the hospi-
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law,""15 or that lawyers would seek guidance from the "lawyer's standard
philosophical map."'' Nor should we be surprised that court-oriented me-
diation exhibits a symbiotic relationship with its repeat players. Indeed,
sociological theories and research affirm that social structures-including
dispute resolution processes-inevitably influence and are influenced by
those who seek access to and, through their actions, recreate the struc-
tures. 152
150 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law. The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (explaining how the projected outcome of trial will provide
"bargaining chips" in a negotiation).
151 See Riskin, supra note 34, at 44-45. Riskin observes:
What appears on the map is determined largely by the power of two assumptions about mat-
ters that lawyers handle: (1) that disputants are adversaries-i.e., if one wins, the other must
lose-and (2) that disputes may be resolved through application, by a third party, of some
general rule of law....
On the lawyer's standard philosophical map ... the client's situation is seen atomistically;
many links are not printed. The duty to represent the client zealously within the bound,- of
the law discourages concern with both the opponent's situation and the overall social eftect
of a given result.
Moreover, on the lawyer's standard philosophical map, quantities are bright and large while
qualities appear dimly or not at all. When one party wins, in this vision, usually the other
party loses, and, most often, the victory is reduced to a money judgment. This "reduction" of
nonmaterial values-such as honor, respect, dignity, security and love-to amounts of
money, can have one of two effects. In some cases, these values are excluded from the deci-
sion maker's considerations, and thus from the consciousness of the lawyers, as irrelevant. In
others, they are present but transmuted into something else-a justification for money
damages....
... The lawyer's standard world view is based upon a cognitive and rational outlook.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
152 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF
STRUCTURATION 19 (1984) ("[T]he rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction
of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction (the duality of structure).");
ANTHONY GIDDENS, STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 118 (1977) ("[S]tructure is the gen-
erative source of social interaction but is reconstituted only in such interaction."), cited in Clinton W.
Francis, Practice, Strategy, and Institution: Debt Collection in the English Common-Law Courts, 1740-
1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 869 (1986).
In mobilizing structure as the medium of social interaction, actors reproduce the structure.
The idea that structure helps constitute action and is at the same time reconstituted by ac-
tion-the notion that it is both the medium and the outcome of action-is expressed in the
concept of the "duality of structure." This concept replaces the dualism of subject (the
knowledgeable actor) and object (structure) entrenched in traditional social theory, and ex-
emplified in functionalism, structuralism, and economic analysis. Structuration theory opens
the way for the development of a theory in which the subject interacts in a reciprocal fashion
with structure, without determinatively attaching causal primacy to either.
Francis, supra at 869. See also Arthur F. McEvoy, A New Realism for Legal Studies, 2005 WIs. L. REV.
433, 434, 437-38 (describing New Legal Realism as assuming the "reciprocal, recursive... interaction
[among] law, experience, and culture" that is inspired by Giddens' theory of structuration; offering the
example of scholarship regarding "'girl watching' in the workplace" which "excuses itself as a kind of
harmless masculine play-boys just horsing around-but ... also ratifies and reproduces a system of
social dominance[,] ... oppresses its subjects, blinds the perpetrators to the harm they do, and enervates
potential response on the part of anybody concemed. Entitlement, behavior, and consciousness inter-
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We also do not mean to suggest that the operant problem definition in
this case was necessarily the wrong one. We do mean to point out that the
problem definition was narrow and that the lawyers, claims adjusters, and
mediators set that problem definition without giving the Sabias the oppor-
tunity to exercise any influence in regard to it. The repeat players assumed
the standard problem definition, rather than customizing it to fit the con-
cerns of the actual plaintiffs. Also apparently without consultation with the
Sabias, the lawyers and mediator established a mediation procedure that
had the effect of excluding the Sabias from the kind of direct participation
that would have been meaningful to them. The Sabias' lawyers did this with
the best of intentions-to protect their clients' legal and financial inter-
ests. 153 And given the realities of the situation, including the potential effect
of Tony's strong and unruly emotions,154 we do not mean to suggest that
judgments made by his lawyer and the other professionals were wrong or
unwise. We merely mean to highlight the huge gap between the predisposi-
tions as to problem definition held by Tony and Donna, on the one hand,
and the repeat players, on the other.
The lawyers and mediators in Sabia apparently established the prob-
lem definition and procedures without any explicit discussion, acknowl-
edgement, or possibly even awareness that the problem definition could be
broader. Figure 2 illustrates our assessments of the differences among the
Sabia participants in their predispositions or aspirations concerning the
problem definition and who should exercise influence in determining the
problem definition.
act-reciprocally and recursively.") (footnotes omitted); Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the
Authority ofAdjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1384-85 (2006).
[A]n engagement with the legal process does not just translate or test disputants' claims but
fundamentally reconstitutes them, specifically by transforming brute demands into assertions
of right, which depend on reasons and therefore by their nature implicitly recognize the con-
ditions of their own failure .... [T]he transformative effect on a dispute of the legal process
is potentially so powerful ... that the parties abandon any of their demands that cannot be
accommodated within the transformation. When this happens, the legitimacy of the legal
process naturally follows, because the reconstructed disputes and the resolutions that the le-
gal process proposes have been tailored to suit each other ....
Id. at 1385. See also GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES 11-12 (2d ed. 2001) (illustrating
how ecological factors lead to societal norms which then lead to societal institutions with particular
structures and ways of functioning; further illustrating how these become mutually reinforcing and
result in cultural stability; finally illustrating that outside forces (e.g., forces of nature or man) can pro-
duce change).
153 WERTH, supra note 56, at 310-311.
154 Id. at 152-53,310-11.
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LOW INFLUENCE
Figure 2.
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The horizontal axis in Figure 2 mimics the horizontal axis in Figure 1,
illustrating a narrow problem definition at the left and a broad problem
definition at the right. The vertical axis adds a new dimension: who exer-
cises influence in "setting" the problem. Points near the top of this axis
show high influence, and points toward the bottom of this axis show low
influence.155 Point A shows the aspirations or predisposition of the mediator
(M), representatives of the defendants (D), and the lawyers (Ls): that the
problem definition should be narrow, in accordance with their customary
practices in negotiation and mediation and that they and the other repeat
players would exercise great influence over the problem definition.156 Point
155 See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitra-
tion, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 885 (2002) (observing how designers of dispute systems can choose
how, when, and whom to empower).
156 Norms and practices are much less likely to diverge between lawyers and their repeat corporate
clients. See David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES, supra note 52, at 68, 84-85. See also JOHN P.
HEINz & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 335-36
(1982) (discovering two worlds of lawyers; the group of lawyers that serves higher status and corporate
clients has higher status and higher incomes but less autonomy; the group of lawyers that serves indi-
vidual, "ordinary" clients has lower status and income but greater autonomy); JULIE MACFARLANE, THE
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B depicts the plaintiffs"57 predispositions or aspirations, which differed
dramatically from those of the repeat players. The plaintiffs wanted a
broader problem definition and hoped to exercise influence in establishing
it. In fact, Tony tried to exert such influence, but his emotional outburst was
ineffective. " Thus, Point A also identifies the actual problem definitions in
these mediations and the actual influences-the repeat players' prefer-
ences-that brought it about. '5
2. Why Problem Definition Matters
We believe that this kind of disparity between the aspirations of the
one-shot players and the repeat players is quite common, perhaps even the
norm, in mediations of ordinary, non-family civil cases. The repeat players
typically assert their influence to impose a narrow problem definition and
mediation procedures to support it without giving the one-shot players
much opportunity, if any, to influence the problem definition and proce-
dures, or to play a significant role in the mediation.
A recent study of sixty-four court-oriented medical malpractice media-
tions in Ontario provides empirical support for these propositions. 6" De-
spite a rule requiring parties to attend court-connected mediation sessions, it
was quite rare for physicians actually to attend; their lawyers commonly
invoked an opt-out procedure.' 6 Using interviews, questionnaires, and ob-
servations, Tamara Relis found that the lawyers representing plaintiffs and
defendant physicians shared a common set of attitudes and beliefs about the
purpose of the mediations and about whether physicians should attend. 62
Their attitudes and beliefs were directly contrary to those held in common
by plaintiffs and physician defendants. 63 Lawyers on both sides tended to
oppose attendance of physicians despite potential "extra-legal" benefits to
both plaintiffs and physicians. 1"4 The lawyers generally believed that the
purpose of the mediations was to try to settle the case through a monetary
NEW LAWYER: How SETTLEMENT Is TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 3-5 (2007) (describing the
evolution of law firms to accommodate the needs and preferences of corporate clients).
157 For convenience, we use "plaintiff' to include Tony, though he was not technically a party.
158 WERTH, supra note 56, at 319-20 (shouting during mediation, correcting factual errors entered
in the record, and insisting that the offer failed to account for the realities of supporting his handicapped
son).
159 For an explanation of the use of such grids to understand mediation, see Leonard L. Riskin,
Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2003).
160 Relis, supra note 54, at 445, 452-53.
161 Id, at 455-57, 501.
162 Id. at 475.
163 Id. at 461-62.
164 Id. at 457-459.
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agreement, or (from defense counsel's perspective) to encourage the plain-
tiff to abandon the claim.'65 The primary reasons they gave for opposing
attendance by physicians was that physicians did not "instruct on money"
and that their presence could invite an emotional dimension that might in-
terfere with settlement.'66 Physicians' lawyers also believed that their cli-
ents did not want to attend. '67 In stark contrast, every plaintiff and every
physician believed that defendant physicians should attend because this
would allow the plaintiff and defendant to communicate, which they
thought should be a central aspect of the mediation."'6 Relis concludes that
the lawyers saw the mediation as primarily their process; that is, its primary
purpose was to help them reach settlement and any attention to emotional or
psychological needs of the parties was secondary or incidental. 169
What consequences follow from the dominance of the repeat players'
predispositions in court-oriented mediation? First, the narrow focus pre-
ferred by the repeat players can provide certain important protections for
clients and useful boundaries for the lawyers and mediator. For example, if
parties are uncomfortable or incapable of dealing with personal core issues
or cannot use a discussion of such issues to move toward an appropriate
resolution, then an exclusive focus on litigation offers a rational, socially-
supported, and peaceful mechanism for decision-making. 7t Indeed, in a
country that is governed by the rule of law rather than the arbitrary will of
men, it is especially valuable for lawyers to anchor dispute resolution in the
norms provided by our laws. '7"
165 Id. at472-73.
166 Relis, supra note 54, at 461. This analysis is strikingly similar to Michael Koskoff's expressed
concerns regarding the potential negative effect of Tony's participation in mediation. See supra note 87-
89 and accompanying text.
167 Relis, supra note 54, at 464-65.
168 Id. at 481-82. Interestingly, the lawyers who represented hospitals tended to see good reasons
for physicians to attend. Id. at 463. Perhaps significantly, these lawyers also were more likely to be
women than the lawyers representing the plaintiffs or the defendant physicians. However, these lawyers
did not want hospital employees, such as nurses, to attend. They supported this attitude with the same
sorts of reasons that physicians' lawyers had used to justify excluding their clients: the hospital employ-
ees did not "instruct on money" and might bring in emotions that could interfere with settlement. Id. at
464-68.
169 1d. at 473.
170 See Ackerman, supra note 22, at 55.
171 See Jean R. Stemlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?
Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 572 (2007) ("The strength and appeal of the rule of law
critique should not be underestimated. In the United States, even many of ADR's staunchest advocates
recognize that there are circumstances in which disputes are better resolved publicly, through litigation,
rather than through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or some other private means."); Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1662 (2005).
From a rule of law standpoint, we hope that our public litigation system will ensure predict-
able, fair, and consistent interpretation of the society's laws. The fundamental premises of
the "rule of law" are that similarly 3ituated persons should be treated similarly under the law
and that persons of privilege or influence should not receive special treatment
2008]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
Second, though-and this is our main point- the untempered domi-
nance of the repeat players' predispositions sometimes will deprive clients
and lawyers of opportunities for better processes and better outcomes, rob-
bing mediation of its greatest potential for helping parties. Some may ques-
tion whether it matters that mediation may not be achieving its full poten-
tial. When clients bring their disputes to lawyers, lawyers take primary
responsibility for the means that will be used to achieve their clients' objec-
tives.172 If lawyers exercise that responsibility by invoking a narrow per-
spective on the problem and choosing mediators who implement that focus,
thus determining the preferences of the market, what is the harm?
Our main concern is that the choice to create such a narrowly focused
mediation is rarely the result of deliberation or even consultation that in-
cludes clients 73-particularly the one-shot players who are often involved
in personal injury, medical malpractice, employment, contract, and admin-
istrative cases. Instead, this approach to mediation usually rests on lawyers'
habitual ways of seeing and behaving, and their preference to continue op-
erating in the manner that is most comfortable for them. 174 As we have seen,
it sometimes forecloses problem definitions, processes, and outcomes that
might better serve the parties, without letting anyone know what they are
missing.'75 And it does this in an almost imperceptible fashion. The repeat
players tend to assume implicitly that the problem definition is narrow; this
leads them to establish procedures that will be limited primarily to the kind
of information that is relevant to litigation (and economic) issues. 76 And,
once such a mediation commences, information and perspectives that would
Id.; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 404.; Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165,
196 (2003).
The public spectacle of civil litigation gives life to the 'rule of law.' To demonstrate
that the law's authority can be mobilized by the least powerful as well as the most powerful
in society, we need to observe employees and consumers successfully suing large corpora-
tions and government agencies, minority group members successfully suing majority group
members ....
Id.; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) ("Civil litigation is an institu-
tional arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals."); IAN
SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3-4, 66-67 (2003) (viewing democracy as "a means of
managing power relations so as to minimize domination" arising from "the illegitimate exercise of
power" and that the courts' role is to declare when unacceptable "domination has emerged" from major-
ity rule requiring that "the parties try anew to find an accommodation").
172 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/home.html ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued."); id. at R. 1.4(a)(2) (2007) ("A lawyer shall ... reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished.").
173 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
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broaden the focus are largely absent, excluded, or marginalized.1' In other
words, the procedures not only rely on the professionals' assumptions about
the appropriate problem definition-they also make that definition real.
3. A Customized Mediation that Would Have Considered the
Sabias' Core Concerns
What might a mediation designed to consider all of the Sabias' core
concerns, including their need to understand what happened to Little Tony,
have looked like? The mediation could have been different in three ways. A
first modification would have allowed Tony and Donna to be present during
the joint sessions in the first mediation.'78 It is likely that this simple change
would have enhanced their participation. If Tony and Donna had been pre-
sent, their lawyers likely would have consulted with them beforehand to
determine what they thought was most important to say in these sessions in
order to educate the defendants and their lawyers and try to reach resolu-
tion. The Sabias would have witnessed their story being told by their law-
yers. Hopefully, they also would have witnessed the respectful verbal and
non-verbal responses of the defendants' representatives. The mediator
might have chosen to paraphrase and demonstrate to the Sabias that he had
heard and understood their perspective.'79 Simple attendance likely would
have increased the Sabias' perception of their control over the process, 8 '
which seemingly also would have enhanced their sense of process-related
autonomy, role, status, and perhaps even appreciation and affiliation.' 8'
177 See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
178 See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 269,
339 (1999) (observing that parties' participation in mediation permits them to "overcome problems that
are created when they are represented by attorneys or agents in settlement negotiations").
179 See Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: The Understanding-
BasedModel of Mediation, 2006 J. DIsP. RESOL. 523, 536.
180 See Welsh, supra note 108, at 820-26, 841-44 (explaining the effect of "voice," "consideration"
and "even-handed," "dignified, respectful" treatment on perceptions of procedural justice and describing
early studies finding that when parties witnessed their lawyers' presentations, they perceived process
control); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Expanding Our Models of Justice in Dispute Resolution: A
Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice 15-20 (2002), available at http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=-305205 (finding that disputants' satisfaction with mediation in the U.S. Postal Service REDRESS
program was best explained by their perceptions of their interactions with each other-and particularly,
being empowered (i.e., exercising control over the process) and receiving recognition (i.e., receiving
respectful treatment from the other)). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
181 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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A second modification would have allowed an even more active role
for the Sabias. "2 In both joint session and caucus, the mediator could have
invited the Sabias to supplement their lawyers' statements, enabling Tony
and Donna to describe their lives and needs in their own words. With their
lawyers' assistance, the Sabias might have prepared their own opening
statements describing their suffering, success, limited understanding of
what led to their son's disability, and hopes and fears about the future.'83
Such statements likely would have required additional time from the
Sabias' lawyers in preparing their clients, as well as more time from every-
one early in the mediation session.' The provision of this opportunity,
however, likely would have responded to some of the Sabias' core concerns
and resulted in presentations that were less strident and emotionally charged
than Tony's actual outburst in the second mediation.
This decision to address the Sabias' core concerns by including them
throughout the mediation and increasing their participation also could have
changed the substance of what the lawyers chose to say in the mediation.
The plaintiffs' lawyers might have included different information or chosen
to emphasize different points or potential solutions.'85 The defendants' law-
yers might have tailored their presentations to respond to the Sabias' lim-
ited familiarity with the law, litigation process, negotiation, and media-
tion."8 6 Members of the defense team might have expressed acknowledg-
ment, appreciation, or empathy. The Sabias' presence and greater participa-
182 For a description of the various ways parties can participate in a mediation and their potential
advantages and disadvantages, see Leonard L Riskin, The Represented Client in A Settlement Confer-
ence: The Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1075-87,
1097-1116 (1991). Of course, there are potential risks to the greater participation. We discuss one such
risk, the negotiator's dilemma. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. In addition, there is the poten-
tial that a client will reveal information that later guides opposing counsel's post-mediation discovery
and results in damaging evidence presented at trial. Though the original disclosure may be protected
from admission, the Uniform Mediation Act provides that "[e]vidence or information that is otherwise
admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by
reason of its disclosure or use in a mediation." UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 4(c), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/uma200l.pdf. See Stuart Widman, More Mediation
Confidentiality Limits: What the Court May Allow in to Establish a Settlement Agreement,
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG., Dec. 2006, at 180. See also Rojas v. Superior Court, 793
P.3d 260, 266, 271 (Cal. 2004) (holding that pursuant to California statute, only the evidence prepared
for a mediation session is protected); Joel M. Grossman, Clarifying the Confidentiality of Mediation
Evidence, L.A. LAW, Apr. 2004, 14-19 (discussing California Evidence Code Section 1119 and case
law).
183 See Tom Arnold, 20 Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIG., May 1995, at 69 (urging lawyers to prepare their clients to make opening statements).
184 See Welsh, supra note 80, at 632 (describing school officials' variable appreciation of the time
required to permit parents to make initial presentations in mediation sessions).
185 See Macfarlane, supra note 43, at 270-77 (reporting lawyers' perceptions that their understand-
ing of the dispute and potential resolutions change when their clients attend the mediation session).
186 See Arnold, supra note 183, at 70 (suggesting that presentations in mediation be addressed to
the decision makers on the other side of the table, rather than the mediator).
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tion might have made it more likely that Doyle would have revealed his
family history to his clients or to the mediator.'87 It then may have been
easier for him to express the kind of understanding that the Sabias so sorely
needed as they dealt with a role, status, and affiliation they never sought.
With the Sabias in attendance, both the lawyers and the mediators
would have been more likely to ask questions to elicit the Sabias' core con-
cerns and other interests. 8 8 If the Sabias revealed any such concerns, the
mediators could have been prepared to respond appropriately, with active
listening and facilitation of discussion regarding those concerns that the
mediation could address. The mediators also could have asked the lawyers
to prepare their clients to listen carefully to each other, not only for facts,
but also for any core concerns or emotions. Alternatively, during the media-
tion itself, the mediators could have urged the parties to listen to learn from
each other, despite the inevitable difficulty of doing so.
Coupled with their eventual and substantial settlement,'89 Tony's and
Donna's enhanced role in the mediation session might have helped them to
achieve a cognitive and emotional resolution, as well as an increased level
of satisfaction with the process and outcome. 9° Equally important, even
partial satisfaction of the Sabias' process-related core interests would have
created some positive emotions, or at least decreased some of their negative
emotions, making the Sabias better partners in negotiation.' Indeed, modi-
fying the mediation process to elicit and respond to Tony's and Donna's
core concerns would not have replaced the discussion of the law and its
implications. Rather, it may have improved their ability to comprehend and
participate in that discussion.
Third, the mediation could have been structured to respond to the
Sabias' likely need to know what really caused the damage to Little Tony
and his stillborn brother. Both of the actual mediations included much talk
about causation.'92 In the second mediation, the mediators considered it "the
key issue.""' But they were talking about legal causation, or the proof of
and arguments about causation that could be offered in a court of law. This
meant that the lawyers on each side tried to find expert witnesses who
187 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
188 See infra Part II.A.1 for proposed questions.
189 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
190 Although disputants generally express satisfaction with mediation, they are even more likely to
be satisfied with mediation if their case settles. See Jennifer E. Shack, Bibliographic Summary of Cost,
Pace, and Satisfaction Studies of Court-Related Mediation Programs (2003), http://aboutrsi.org/
pfimages/MedStudyBiblio2ndEd2.pdf (listing the methodologies, variables examined, and key findings
of more than 50 studies of court-connected mediation). See also Wissler, supra note 49, at 661.
191 Fisher and Shapiro recommend expressing appreciation, building affiliation, respecting auton-
omy, acknowledging status, and choosing a fulfilling role in order to generate positive emotions. See
FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 17.
192 See supra notes 75, 91, 95 and sources cited therein.
193 WERTH, supra note 56, at 360.
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would support an argument about what happened that was consistent with
the legal theory that would help them win. The lawyers' behavior was use-
ful, necessary, and entirely appropriate in this court-oriented mediation. But
Tony and Donna wanted to understand what had really caused the damage
to Little Tony and his stillborn sibling and whether it could have been pre-
vented. 94 For that reason, these adversarial arguments provided no cogni-
tive resolution for the Sabias, and that contributed to their failure to find an
emotional resolution.
Would it have been feasible, or appropriate, for a mediation process in
a case such as this to accommodate Tony's and Donna's interest in knowing
what really happened? As mentioned above, trials, and the mediations that
take place in the dark shadows of trials, search for solutions by relying
principally on a very limited form of truth-seeking: the presentation of le-
gally relevant factual information in the context of adversarial argumenta-
tion and consideration of the realities and risks of litigation. '95 Each of the
repeat players seemed to assume that this was the appropriate way to ad-
dress the causation question. What about other options? Based on Barry
Werth's description of the Sabia case, it is clear that no one really knew
what happened.196 And in a negotiation or mediation, as opposed to a trial,
finding the facts is not essential for resolution. However, if the lawyers had
fully accepted the Sabias' "need" to know what really happened, they
would have had options. For instance, they could have agreed to hire a neu-
tral expert to examine the facts and make a report.'97 Or they might have
decided on a more elaborate, non-adversarial procedure to develop informa-
tion.
Professor Eric D. Green describes the creation and operation of such a
non-adversarial, information-gathering process in connection with a case in
Toms River, New Jersey.'98 Residents of Toms River believed that pollut-
ants emitted into the air and water by various corporations caused cancer. 99
Rather than joining others who had filed lawsuits, "the families instead de-
cided it was more important to try to find out what really was happening to
their children and why."2  They hired Green to help them design a process
194 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. They also wanted an admission that the hospital was
at fault, which, of course, the defense would never offer. Id.
195 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
196 See Stephen D. Easton, Damages: Expert Witnesses, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 37, 51-54. But see
Letter from Michael Koskoff to Leonard Riskin, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
197 But see Letter from Michael Koskoff to Leonard Riskin, supra note 103 (observing that remain-
ing uncertainty made monetary settlement possible and that it would not have been possible to find an
unbiased expert).
198 Eric D. Green, Re-Examining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Litigation: Les-
sons from Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1171, 1196-98 (2006).
199 Id. at 1196.
200 Id.
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that might provide such knowledge. 20 1 It was a non-adversarial, scientific
dialogue, over which Green presided not as a mediator, but as a so-called
"Institutional Memory. 2 2 The dialogue produced much of the knowledge
the parents sought and led to a mediation, conducted by Green, that pro-
duced a settlement. The parents never filed a lawsuit.2 3
In the Sabia case, such a procedure probably would not have produced
a clear picture of the causes of this tragedy; more likely, it would have re-
vealed that no one could be certain about the causes. Still, recognition of
that reality, in itself, could have allowed the Sabias a higher degree of cog-
nitive and emotional resolution than the adversarial argumentation that
characterized the mediations. If both sides had conducted a joint and careful
investigation that ultimately led to a recognition that causation was uncer-
tain, this might have led to an easier settlement.2"
It might seem far-fetched to imagine that repeat players such as those
in the Sabia case would agree to a formal, non-adversarial process; how-
ever, a broader focus designed to uncover and respond to the parties' under-
lying interests is a staple in the mediation literature and characterizes cer-
tain models of practice.2 5 There is also evidence that repeat mediation play-
ers in commercial cases value the understanding and satisfaction of under-
lying interests. 206 If such a focus had been employed here, it might have led
to the inclusion of Dr. Maryellen Humes, the obstetrician, who agreed to
settle the claim against her under pressure from her insurance carrier, based
largely on the idea that she would not be well-received by a jury.207 Neither
she nor the Sabias thought she had done anything wrong.208 Direct contact
between the Sabias and Dr. Humes, as part of an effort to understand what
had happened, might have led to a form of emotional healing for all of
them.2"9 Other hospital employees who were involved in Little Tony's birth
201 id.
202 Id. at 1197.
203 Id. at 1197-98.
204 Alternatively, Professor Craig McEwen has suggested that the parties could have agreed that
the hospital or insurance company would pay for a neutral expert to write a report on the cause of Little
Tony's injury after the Sabias settled their lawsuit. The hospital and the doctor would be required to
participate in the investigation required for the report and would receive a copy for their potential use in
making substantive changes. See E-mail from Craig McEwen, Daniel B. Fayerweather Professor of
Political Economy and Sociology, Bowdoin College, to Nancy Welsh and Leonard Riskin (Sept. 7,
2007) (on file with authors).
205 See supra note 42 and sources cited therein.
206 See ABA, Mean Survey Responses, supra note 43.
207 WERTH, supra note 56, at 149.
208 Id. at 194.
209 See Relis, supra note 54, at 481-86 (quoting from plaintiffs and defendant physicians who
sought emotional healing in mediation).
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and who suffered as a result might also have benefited from participating in
such a process. 1°
A less adversarial process that fostered understanding might also have
promoted attention to business or economic issues, such as funding or ad-
ministrative considerations that led to what seemed to be shortages in hos-
pital staffing. In addition, it might have prompted a consideration of com-
munity issues (e.g., the value of having better pre- and post-natal care for
people like the Sabias). Of course, the lawyers, the hospital, and the defen-
dants' insurance carriers likely would have seen risks in any such lines of
inquiry. Such a choice also could have required the investment of substan-
tial additional time and resources into the mediation itself.
Unfortunately, the Sabias never had the choice of participating in a
more customized mediation session, such as we have described. In Part II,
we present a method for customizing mediation and three proposals de-
signed to enable parties in court-connected and private mediations to par-
ticipate in choosing whether to engage in such a customized process. Our
particular concern in developing these proposals is for one-shot players like
the Sabias.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PROBLEM
DEFINITION IN COURT-ORIENTED MEDIATION
In recent years, law schools, law firms, government agencies, adminis-
trators of court-connected ADR programs, dispute resolution trainers, and
mediation providers have attempted to broaden lawyers' understanding of
the issues that could be relevant for the resolution of disputes. Law schools
and CLE providers regularly offer instruction in interest-based negotia-
tion," supported by a rash of excellent books.1  Courts have produced
210 See WERTH, supra note 56, at 129-38 (discussing the emotions of nurses Barbara McManamy
and Molly Fortuna regarding Little Tony's birth). Considerations of legal risk probably impelled law-
yers to exclude them. And that, of course, is the result of an exclusively adversarial focus.
211 See, e.g., Moritz College of Law of Ohio State University-Academic Programs (Alternative
Dispute Resolution), Legal Negotiations, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/course-descriptions
.php#703 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("Study of the theory, law, and practice of transactional and set-
tlement negotiations. Selected topics include ... adversarial versus problem-solving negotiating frame-
works; distributive versus integrative negotiating issues .... "); HLS: Courses, Negotiation Workshop
A, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2007-08/?id-4120 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("Top-
ics will include... integrative and distributive bargaining .... ); University of Texas School of Law,
Alternative Dispute Resolution, https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/curriculum/adr/courses.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("The seminar first provides a brief overview of the basic ADR processes
and interest-based negotiation theory"); Washburn University School of Law, Continuing Legal Educa-
tion Program: Collaborative Family Law Workshop, http://www.washburnlaw.edu/cle/programs/200403
collaborativelaw.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (Topics include, "The Basic Interest Based Negotiation
Model-The foundation of Collaborative Law").
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extensive publications describing dispute resolution options and media-
tion's potential to deal with a broad set of interests.2 3 Mediation skills and
mediation advocacy training programs have urged mediators and lawyers to
focus on interests." 4 Much writing, teaching, and training on the role of
emotions in negotiation have also appeared recently. 2 5 There is certainly
evidence that the books, publications and educational programs have made
some difference. They have helped to produce broader perspectives and
more attention to the needs of individual parties in some sectors-including
substantial commercial cases involving sophisticated parties on both sides
and large environmental and other public policy disputes-but not in many
of the court-oriented, non-family cases we address. In this context, the law-
yers-even those who have been trained in and appreciate interest-based
negotiation-tend to employ their habitual lens,2 6 and the mediators tend to
212 See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESS FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING (2006); JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
LAW (2006); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY (2002).
213 See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Court of the N. Dist. of Cal., Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Northern
District of California 20 (2005), available at http://www.adr.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Dispute Reso-
lution Procedures" hyperlink). The Northern District of California requires lawyers to certify to the
court that they have read this publication. See N.D. CAL. CIv. R. 16-8. Lawyers are also required to
review the publication with their clients. Id.
214 See, e.g., Nebraska Mediation Center Association, http://www.nemediation.org (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008) ("[A] non-profit organization with a primary focus of providing interest-based mediation
training."); Northern Virginia Mediation Service, Interest-Based Problem Solving Teams,
http://www.nvms.us/catalog05.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("This is a hands on workshop for those
involved in leading and participating in interest-based problem resolution teams."); Dispute Resolution
Center, Basic Mediation Course, http://www.austindrc.org/mediation-training. (last visited Feb. 21,
2008) (Participants learn "[a] seven-stage mediation process based on the theory of interest-based nego-
tiation."); Connecticut Mediation, ADR/Mediation Training for Collaborative Professionals,
http://www.connecticutmediation.com/training.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (Topics include "[ilnter-
est based conflict resolution, facilitative, narrative and transformative mediation methods.").
215 See, e.g., FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 128; Leigh Thompson et al., The Three Faces of Eve:
Strategic Displays of Positive, Negative, and Neutral Emotions in Negotiation, 99 ORG'L BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 81 (2006); Clark Freshman, After Basic Mindfulness Meditation: External
Mindfulness, Emotional Truthfulness, and Lie Detection in Dispute Resolution, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
511; Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotia-
tion, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (2005); Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, The Law-
yer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know and Don 't Know About How Mood Relates to Suc-
cessful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 1.
216 See Milton Heumarm & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement
Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want," 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253,
309-10 (1997)
While 61% of the lawyers would like to see more problem-solving negotiation methods,
about 71% of negotiations are carried out with positional methods instead....
[F urther empirical research that generates even more detail than we have been able to cap-
ture ... may reveal ways in which the structure of negotiation itself plays a more powerful
role, or may reveal elements of habitual social practice that stand out as being particularly re-
sponsible for the existing state of affairs.
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either share the narrow, adversarial perspective or adopt it to accommodate
the lawyers who hire them. Indeed, some mediators have told us that, al-
though they would like to encourage the parties to focus more broadly, they
ordinarily do not do so because they anticipate that the lawyers, and maybe
the clients, will not agree, or that the lawyers might lose enthusiasm for
using them in the present case or in the future.
As we argued in Part I, one factor that contributes to the narrowness of
the typical problem definitions in the mediations that we have been discuss-
ing is that the repeat players tend to adopt procedures based on a narrow
problem definition, and these procedures in turn make it difficult to broaden
the problem definition. In this Part, we propose mechanisms to encourage
and enable mediation participants-actual parties, lawyers, and media-
tors-to explore problems broadly in a particular case and then to decide
what problem definition is most appropriate. First, we offer a systematic
way of "setting" '217 the problem in any court-oriented mediation to encour-
age the most appropriate problem definition in a given case. Then, we pro-
pose two variations of a rule that would help lawyers, mediators, and parties
implement this systematic way of working with problem definition in court-
oriented mediation." 8 Last, we offer a third proposal that encourages courts
and private providers to offer to "customize" every mediation to seek an
appropriate problem definition.
A. A Three-Step Method for Identifying and Addressing "the Problem"
Our first recommendation is a distillation of good practices in other
mediation arenas.219 The main idea is to make explicit the process of creat-
ing the problem definition for a mediation. The first step is "mapping the
problem,""22 that is, exploring the situation comprehensively, and, to the
extent possible, without preconceptions about what is relevant or important.
Id
217 See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION 18 (1983); DONALD SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW
DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
218 But see John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and other ADR
Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 623-24 (2007) (observing that "rather than promoting
,reflective practice,' regulation can promote unrcflective practice" and recommending that "ADR poli-
cymakers should generally begin by considering nonregulatory options and adopt regulatory options
only to the extent needed to accomplish desired goals.") (citations omitted).
219 We are grateful to mediator Howard Bellman of Madison, Wis. for modeling and discussing
such processes at various times. E.g., Interview by Leonard L. Riskin with mediator Howard Bellman,
in Dedham, Mass. (June 18, 2006). See also Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, The
Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: Two Decades of Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 29-30 (2001).
220 The term "mapping" is referenced in MAGGIE HERZIG & LAURA CHASIN, FOSTERING
DIALOGUE ACROSS DIVIDES: A NUTS AND BOLTS GUIDE 20-23 (2006), availalble at http://www.pub-
licconversations.org/pcp/page.php?id=414.
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In court-oriented mediation, this step will include the litigation and eco-
nomic issues, but will also involve looking at potentially relevant personal
core and community issues, as well as the behavioral, cognitive, and emo-
tional dimensions of all of these issues. During the second step, "setting the
problem," the parties decide which aspects of the broadly mapped problem
the mediation will seek to examine further or address, directly or indirectly.
These two steps lead to the third step, "addressing the problem" as it has
been defined.22 We now elaborate on each of these steps.
1. Mapping the Problem
To map the problem in the ordinary case, the participants need to re-
veal to the mediator-and potentially to the other parties-as much as is
feasible and appropriate about all of the issues potentially involved in the
court-oriented mediation. In this context, for reasons we have already ex-
amined, the parties and their lawyers are likely to understand that litigation
issues will be relevant.222 But to get a full picture of the problem, unless the
lawyers and parties are unusually forthcoming, the mediator will need to
encourage the parties to reveal more information. She will need to plumb
for economic issues, personal core issues, and even community issues.223
She will assume that these issues might exist, rather than assuming that they
do not. Further, the mediator will explore all three of the dimensions identi-
fied by Mayer-behavioral, cognitive, and emotional 224-for each issue.
We are aware of some mediators who encourage lawyers and clients to
disclose their underlying interests in writing prior to the mediation, but the
responses generally represent a rehashing of earlier-stated positions or legal
arguments.225 Clearly, it is not sufficient to rely on the question, "What are
your interests?" We propose, therefore, that at the request of the mediator or
otherwise, the parties consider questions such as the following: 26
221 We should note, however, that the first steps do not lead inevitably to the third step. Sometimes,
just giving witness to a person's suffering can help. See WILLIAM URY, THE THIRD SIDE 170-76 (2000).
222 See supra Part I.B.I(1).
223 See Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 316 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (observing that the strategy of asking about
these other issues can help overcome bias, including the status quo bias).
224 See MAYER, supra note 100, at 41-16.
225 For example, lawyer-mediator Sheldon J. Stark of Ann Arbor, Mich. routinely invites the law-
yers to elect to send him confidential letters "describing their own underlying needs and interests in the
case, and how they size up the underlying needs and interests of the other side." See Engagement Letter,
Sheldon J. Stark (Jan. 4, 2007) (on file with authors). Although many lawyers elect to send such confi-
dential letters, they almost never actually describe their underlying interests, tending instead to restate
their positions (which he asks them to include only in other letters that they are to share with each
other). Interview by Leonard L. Riskin with Sheldon J. Stark, in Port Huron, Mich. (May 28, 2007).
226 See infra Part II.B (discussing exactly how these questions should be raised and by whom).
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(1) What do you hope to accomplish and what problem(s) would you
like to address in this mediation? How can the process, the mediator, or
both help you accomplish these goals?227
(2) If the mediation focuses on the legal strengths and weaknesses of
your case and the likely cost of continuing in litigation, will this be suffi-
cient to help you reach a complete resolution of your dispute with the other
party? If not, what other non-litigation issues need to be addressed? How
could they be addressed?
(3) As you imagine settling this dispute, what are your most important
needs or goals? (For example, are you most concerned about compensation
for expenses? The availability of future medical coverage for you or your
dependents? Training? Assistance in finding a job? An apology? Maintain-
ing your reputation? A change in the other party's behavior or business
practice? A change in your relationship with the other party?)
(4) What do you think are the most important needs or goals of the
other side?
(5) If not already described, is there anything besides the payment of
money that would help to resolve this matter?22
(6) If not already described, do the parties need to change any behav-
iors to resolve this conflict? If yes, what behavioral changes are required?
(7) If not already described, are emotions a significant part of this con-
flict? If yes, what outcome or procedure could help you (or the other party)
to feel at peace about this dispute and its resolution?
(8) How would you describe the communications or negotiations you
have had with each other up until now? Why haven't you been able to reach
a resolution?229
(9) Do you have any questions about how the mediation process
works? Do you have any questions or concerns about your role during the
presentations or discussions? Do you have any questions or concerns about
your role in making a decision about whether to settle your case?
In the Sabia case, if the parties and their lawyers had responded to
these sorts of questions, Donna and Tony (or their lawyers) might have
revealed important clues about their personal core concerns of appreciation,
227 These questions can be framed in other ways. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 80, at 673-74 (ques-
tions for pre-mediation interview instrument).
228 Professor Jeanne Brett has found that while some cultural groups tend to ask questions about
interests and priorities as a means to develop integrative solutions, other groups are more likely to share
a series of proposals and counter-proposals as a means to discern interests and priorities. See JEANNE M.
BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE
DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 61-66 (2001). This question, which focuses on outcomes
rather than interests, is meant to engage those who think more like the latter group. Id.
229 Our thanks to Professor Michael Moffitt for proposing this additional question. E-mail from
Michael Moffitt to authors (Sept. 10, 2007) (on file with authors).
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autonomy, role, status, and affiliation, along with the behavioral, cognitive,
and emotional aspects of these needs, especially their need to understand
what had happened. The interests and needs of individuals and organiza-
tions on the defense side, though less obvious,2"' also could have been dis-
cussed with the mediator. Such revelations could have occurred before the
mediation or during the mediation in private caucuses or joint session.
2. Setting the Problem: Selecting the Issues to be Addressed in the
Mediation Process
In this step, the parties and lawyers advise the mediator regarding the
aspects of the broadly mapped problem that they wish to include in the me-
diation, either explicitly or more indirectly. They can respond to questions
such as the following:
Should the mediation address:
(1) All of your non-litigation issues? If not, which non-litigation issues
should be addressed?
(2) All of your underlying needs and goals? If not, which underlying
needs and goals should be addressed?
(3) All of the other side's underlying needs and goals? If not, which
underlying needs and goals should be addressed?
(4) The needs of individuals or organizations that are not direct parties
to this lawsuit or potential lawsuit?
(5) Behavioral changes, if these are an important part of resolving this
dispute?
(6) The parties' different understandings of what took place, if these
are an important part of resolving this dispute?
(7) The parties' emotions, if these are an important part of resolving
this dispute?
(8) All of the above issues explicitly? Alternatively, should the media-
tion process address certain issues only indirectly? How?
The mediator can also interject her thoughts regarding the utility of in-
corporating various issues into the discussion, explicitly or implicitly. In the
Sabia case, step two might have led to a request from the Sabias concerning
their interest in receiving an acknowledgement of how much they had suf-
fered and how well they had coped. The hospital, its insurer, and its lawyers
230 If Dr. Humes had remained in the case, her interests and needs could have been nearly as
poignant as those of the Sabias.
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then could have made an implicit23" ' or explicit decision about whether to
venture beyond the standard litigation issues. They could have discussed
the potential value-to their case, to their lawyer-of permitting Doyle, the
lead defense lawyer, to reveal his familiarity with the difficulty of caring
for a disabled child.232 Engagement in this step also could have led to an
explicit decision to use the mediation to provide the Sabias with a cognitive
understanding of the events that led to their son's disability---or to make it
clear that the achievement of such an understanding was not feasible. In
addition, if Tony and Donna had wished to address a community issue (e.g.,
a strong interest in protecting other similarly situated mothers and new-
borns), while the hospital also had a similar interest, the problem definition
might also have included a focus on potential changes to hospital regula-
tions and procedures.
3. Addressing the Problem
In this step, the parties, lawyers, and mediator establish the mediation
process and begin to address the problem or problems they have set. If the
participants in the Sabia case had agreed to address Tony's and Donna's
personal core concerns, both Tony's and Donna's participation in the me-
diation and the examination of the events leading up to Little Tony's birth
might have varied quite dramatically from what occurred in the actual me-
diation sessions.
Similarly, in the mediation of a corporate contract dispute, the corpo-
rate representatives may choose to speak with each other about the personal
toll that each has borne and will continue to bear if the dispute is not re-
solved.23 3 They may even discuss their organizations' different cultural ex-
pectations and their mutual need for recognition of and appreciation for
their attempts to accommodate each other. In an employment mediation, the
employer and a long-time employee may choose to discuss the health needs
of the employee's spouse that have affected the employee's personal core
concerns and that also restrict the retirement options available to the em-
ployee.
Of course, none of the benefits of mapping and setting the problem
will occur if the parties or their lawyers choose not to reveal the other issues
that could become part of the mediation. Non-disclosure is a frequent tactic
231 Even if they did not make the explicit choice to address this issue, the defendants would now be
sensitized to its existence and could then choose whether or not to respond at some point in the media-
tion.
232 Their decision, of course, would reflect the tension between empathy and assertiveness. See
generally Robert H. Mnookin et al., The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217
(1996).
233 This example is based on one of the authors' experience in mediating corporate contract dis-
putes, as well as a situation described in FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 164-68.
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employed by negotiators due to the phenomenon known as the negotiator's
dilemma. 234 Negotiators achieve optimal outcomes when they collabo-
rate, 235 but they generally do not know whether they can count on each
other to collaborate. And collaboration presents risks. If one negotiator tries
to collaborate while the other competes, the competitor gains the advantage.
Thus, even if the Sabias had been given the opportunity to reveal their core
interests in appreciation and autonomy, it is quite possible that their lawyer
would have counseled against revealing this information out of fear that the
defendants might use it to fashion a smaller monetary settlement.
It would be magical thinking to believe that steps one and two would
prompt all parties to reveal all of the information that is necessary to choose
the most appropriate problem definition. However, we believe that explic-
itly taking the first two steps-mapping the problem and then setting it-
will make it likely that the appropriate problem definition will be realized in
a larger percentage of court-oriented mediations than under the current sys-
tem. In order for that to happen, of course, the mediation must employ pro-
cedures that will help participants attend to the issues embraced within the
problem definition.
In the next section we propose initiatives that courts (and private ADR
providers) could use to enhance the likelihood that appropriate problem
definitions will develop.
B. Court (and Private) Initiatives to Encourage Establishment of
Appropriate Problem Definitions
The series of steps outlined above is not a radical new idea; rather, it is
a distillation of practices commonly taught in many negotiation and media-
tion courses and employed in the mediation of cases that typically are
viewed as worthy of extra care (e.g., environmental cases,236 public policy
disputes involving large numbers of parties,237 large commercial matters).238
234 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 29-45 (1986); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11-43 (2000).
235 We have chosen to use the language of "collaboration" rather than "cooperation." See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History
of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1619 (1997) (describing the "collaborative, more integrative process
for disputes in which we want to create value before we have to claim it").
236 See Wayne D. Brazil, ADR in a Civil Action: What Could Have Been, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 2007, at 25 (describing how a wise assessment of defendants' interests could have led to an
earlier, more responsive resolution).
237 Brett A. Williams, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Policy Disputes, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 135, 135-37 (describing why public policy disputes are better suited for ADR than a judicial
remedy).
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In the majority of the mediations we are discussing here, however, the law-
yers and mediators assume a litigation focus and narrow the issues to make
them fit that focus, rather than exploring the entire problem and then deter-
mining the appropriate focus for resolving it.239
In this section, we propose three court initiatives that-standing alone
or together-would make it more likely that court-connected mediations
would employ the most appropriate problem definitions. Changes in court
rules, coupled with meaningful judicial involvement,24 have been reasona-
bly effective in motivating lawyers to take the actions needed to overcome
some of the excesses of our adversarial litigation system24' (e.g., conferring
with each other about case management issues and potential settlement,242
attempting to resolve their own disagreements before bringing them to the
238 See Garth, supra note 14, at 930-31 (arguing that large business disputes have their own "elite
ADR market").
239 See Felstiner, supra note 120, at 645 ("[T]he essence of professional jobs is to define the needs
of the consumer of professional services. Generally, this leads to a definition that calls for the profes-
sional to provide such services .. ") (footnotes omitted); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation
of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 2 Mo. J. DIsP. RESOL.
25 (1985); Hensler, supra note 52, at 156-63 (contrasting tort plaintiffs' desire for accountability and
vindication of their legal rights with lawyers' monetary focus in assessing claims). See also Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1367-85 (1992) (describing lawyers' translation of a clinical
client's racial harassment case into a "stop and frisk" case for purposes of litigation); Gay Gellhom, Law
and Language: An Empirically-Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL
L. REV. 321, 350-53 (1998) (describing a clinical law student's failure to hear a client's concern regard-
ing her mental state); Carl J. Hosticka, We Don 't Care What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 599, 600-05 (1979) (describ-
ing lawyer-client interviews in which lawyers quickly interrupted client's narrative and began pursuing
a legal pigeonhole for the case); Jean R. Stermlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation:
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 269, 319-21 (1999) (describing monetary, nonmonetary, and psychological divergences
between lawyers and clients that result in lawyers blocking settlements or reaching settlements that are
inconsistent with clients' self-defined interests).
240 See Bobbi McAdoo, supra note 49, at 472; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 408 (reporting
that Minnesota judges' embrace of ADR-and willingness to order its use-increased the likelihood of
attorneys' use of mediation).
241 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw 229-31 (2001)
("The movement to substitute ADR of various kinds for adversarial litigation in the courts continues to
grow in some types of cases.").
242 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(l)-(2).
Except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(l)(B) or
when the court orders otherwise, the parties must confer as soon as practicable-and in any
event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is
due under Rule 16(b)....
In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of their claims and de-
fenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for
the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable
information; and develop a proposed discovery plan.
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court,2 4 3 counseling their clients about ADR processes,2 " conferring with
each other about ADR,245 proposing the use of appropriate ADR proc-
esses,246 and actually using ADR processes). 47 Many judges order parties
into mediation in part because they believe that the process engages the
parties and produces better outcomes.248 We recommend, and hope, that
some judges-particularly those who fear that mediations in their courts are
not living up to their promise-will launch one or more of these efforts.
The proposals, which we detail below, are: (1) A court rule for existing
243 See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1(c)(2).
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must describe
the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 1 (b). The motion must be served under
Rule 5, but it must not be filed with or be presented to the court if the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days
after service or within another time the court sets.
Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3), d(1)(B).
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions....
A motion for sanctions for failing to answer or respond must include a certification
that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to
act in an effort to obtain the answer or response without court action.
Id.
244 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.03; GA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY CANON 7-5,
available at http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/adr/code.htm ("When a matter is likely to involve litigation,
a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution which might constitute reasonable
alternatives to litigation."). See also Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys' Discussion and Use of
ADR, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 459, 498 (2004) ("Although almost all Georgia attorneys felt they
had an obligation to counsel clients about ADR under an ethical code provision, only 27% always told
their clients about ADR, and 37% frequently did so.").
245 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(c); N.D. IND. R. 16.6(b)(4); D.
MASS. R. 16.1(D)(3)(b). See also McAdoo, supra note 49, at 416 (reporting an increase in lawyers' use
of ADR, particularly mediation, after Rule 114 was adopted); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at
525; Wissler, supra note 244, at 498.
Under a mandatory advising rule, 32% of Missouri attorneys discussed ADR with clients
within the first three months of filing suit, and another 30% did so within the next three
months. Under a mandatory conferring rule, 40% of Minnesota attorneys usually or always
conferred with opposing counsel about ADR within the time period by which they were re-
quired to confer and report to the court. The rate of compliance appeared to be higher (54%)
in a county in which the court devoted substantial resources to enforcing the rule.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Rosselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an
ADR "Confer and Report" Rule, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253, 263-5 (2005) (finding that confer and report rules
alone did not increase the frequency of lawyers' early ADR discussions, but judicial suggestions regard-
ing use of voluntary ADR did increase the frequency of ADR discussions at some point during litiga-
tion).
246 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04.
247 See McAdoo, supra note 49, at 416-17 (reporting an increase in lawyers' use of mediation after
Rule 114 was adopted); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 506, 537 (reporting that one third of
lawyers not using ADR made that choice because judges were not ordering or encouraging it and there-
fore encouraging judges to be more proactive).
248 See McAdoo, supra note 54, at 398-99 (judges report that the following are very important
factors in ordering parties into mediation: "mediation can provide better, more durable outcome for
parties" (56%) and "gets clients directly involved in discussions" (50%)).
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mediation programs directed primarily toward lawyers; (2) A court rule for
existing programs that is directed primarily toward mediators; and (3) A
new court-connected mediation program that offers "customized" media-
tion. Although these proposals apply particularly to the context of court-
connected mediation, we hope that their adoption also would influence
practice in the ordinary court-oriented mediations that, for various rea-
sons,249 are not taking place within court programs.25  There are reasons for
our aspirations: Court-connected mediation has set the standard for many
private mediators' training, understanding of ethical obligations, and prac-
tice.251 Many private mediators also serve as court-connected mediators.252
Private mediators or ADR organizations that become aware of courts' suc-
cessful adoption of any of our proposals may easily incorporate such
changes into their own rules or regular practices for competitive or altruistic
reasons, or both.
1. A Court Rule for Existing Programs that is Directed Primarily
Toward Lawyers
The first approach would focus on affecting the behaviors of lawyers
as they prepare their clients for mediation, 253 regardless of whether the
249 For example, some mediation sessions are occurring pursuant to provisions in boilerplate con-
tracts; others are occurring in mediation programs sponsored by employers, corporations, associations,
agencies, etc.; still others are occurring on an ad hoc basis as a prelude to litigation. See Welsh, supra
note 145, at 488-89 (describing corporate and agency use of mediation); Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Mediation: An Alternate Path, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Mediation/Media-
tionAnAlternatePath/index.htm ("FINRA Dispute Resolution developed a mediation program to provide
additional dispute resolution options for parties. The goal of the mediation program is to provide public
customers, member firms, and associated persons with another effective way to resolve their disputes.").
250 The spread and success of court-connected mediation programs (as well as the language of
courts' rules and codes of ethics) certainly have helped to trigger state and federal agencies' adoption of
mediation programs, as well as private associations' and industry groups' institutionalization of the
process. Some now argue, however, that "the multi-door courthouse bureaucracy ... seriously impairs
the development of an independent, private market for" ADR services. Arthur B. Pearlstein, The Justice
Bazaar: Dispute Resolution Through Emergent Private Ordering as a Superior Alternative to Authori-
tarian Court Bureaucracy, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 739, 783 (2007).
251 Suzanne J. Schmitz, A Critique of the Illinois Circuit Rules Concerning Court-Ordered Media-
tion, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 783, 811-812 (2005).
252 See Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-SponsoredADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
241, 255, 271-78 (2006).
253 . Research has shown that both settlement and parties' perceptions of procedural justice are
enhanced when lawyers spend more time preparing their clients for their participation in mediation. See
Wissler, supra note 49, at 676, 687; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation: Process Viewed as
Fair and Non-Coercive in Ohio Civil Cases, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 30 ("Parties who had
more preparation for mediation by their attorneys felt less pressured to settle by the mediator and felt
that the mediation process was more fair than did parties who were less prepared. Interestingly, attor-
neys who did more to prepare their clients for mediation also felt the mediation process was more fair
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process occurs early or late in the life of the lawsuit. 254 This rule would re-
quire the lawyers to consult with their clients in the creation of written pre-
mediation responses to questions such as those posed in Part II.A 2" and to
submit such responses to the mediator on a confidential basis.256 Although a
party's lawyer could sign this document on her client's behalf, we also sug-
gest a requirement that she certify that the responses represent the result of
a thorough discussion with her client. This submission would help the me-
diator facilitate the first and second steps-mapping and setting the prob-
lem--of the three-step method we have outlined. Even if the mediator were
not following the three-step approach, the submission would help the me-
diator identify the issues that the mediation process could and should ad-
dress.
than did attorneys who did less client preparation."). Such preparation may enable the parties to achieve
cognitive understanding of the process, including its goal and their role. It also may help to moderate
their outcome expectations. Roselle L. Wissler, Which Cases Will Settle?, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2002, at 28 ("Cases were more likely to settle when parties reported more rather than less preparation
for mediation by their attorneys."). See Hensler, supra note 52, at 162-66; Morton Deutsch, Justice and
Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 41, 44 (Morton
Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (explaining the theory of relative deprivation).
254 Mediation can be required immediately after filing, after basic discovery has been completed,
after judicial time or attorneys' fees have reached a certain point, etc. Research has found that early
mediation increases settlement and reduces the time required for disposition of cases. See Wissler, supra
note 49, at 697-98; Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court
Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 289-90 (describing the effects of Ontario's mandatory
mediation program in Ottowa). Mediation could even be required as a condition of filing a lawsuit,
particularly if the parties are unwilling to attempt to negotiate. See Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the
Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 749-51 (2005) (proposing that conferences be required as a condi-
tion of filing a lawsuit); JOHN PEYSNER & MARY SENEVIRATNE, THE MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL CASES:
THE COURTS AND POST-WOOLF LANDSCAPE (2005), http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/9_2005_full
.pdf (describing the communications and exchanges that are now required in the U.K., pursuant to the
Woolf reforms, before a lawsuit may be commenced).
255 Professor Richard Reuben has suggested that a system of check-offs might be clearer or more
efficient. See Richard C. Reuben, The Pendulum Swings Again: Badie, Wright Decisions Underscore
Importance ofActual Assent to Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 18.
256 Obviously, confidentiality would be an important issue and would require the same sort of
protection that applies to the pre-mediation statements currently submitted by parties to mediators. See
supra notes 182, 225 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality).
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Many mediators257 and court-connected mediation programs... already
require the submission of confidential pre-mediation statements to media-
tors.259 Generally, however, these statements reflect the narrow problem
definition that we have described.2" The mediators request information
about the events giving rise to the legal action, the legal theories and de-
fenses relevant to both liability and damages, and the history of settlement
demands and offers.26' Of course, some mediators and court programs go
further and ask about non-litigation interests,262 but many lawyers' re-
257 See, e.g., Darren Aitkin, Winning Mediations: Successful Preparationfor Successful Presenta-
tion, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Nov. 2006, at 32, 32 ("In regard to the mediator, the first step is to know
the mediator's 'local rules'. In other words, what does the mediator want by way of a pre-mediation
submission, and when does she want that material."); Mark A. Frankel & John Mitby, Think Like A
Negotiator: Effectively Mediating Client Disputes, Wis. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 11, 13 ("Mediators fre-
quently request premediation submissions from counsel.")
258 See, e.g., ILL. COOK COUNTY CIR. CT. R. 20.03(c).
At least ten (10) days before the session, each side shall present to the mediator a brief, writ-
ten summary of the case containing a list of issues as to each party... the facts of the occur-
rence, opinions on liability, all damage and injury information, and any offers or demands
regarding settlement. Names of all participants and their relationship to the parties in the me-
diation shall be disclosed to the mediator in the summary prior to the session.
1d; E.D.N.Y. CIv. R. 83.1 l(b)(4).
No less than seven days prior to the first mediation session, each party shall submit directly
to the mediator a mediation statement... outlining the key facts and legal issues in the case.
The statement will also include a description of motions filed and their status, and any other
information that will advance settlement prospects or make the mediation more productive.
Id.
259 See Schmitz, supra note 251, at 800-01 (suggesting that the rule should be revised to provide
more discretion to mediators regarding the content of submissions). See also John Lande, Using Dispute
System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs,
50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 129-30 (2002). Lande proposes that courts require the exchange of position pa-
pers which, at a minimum might include:
(1) the legal and factual issues in dispute, (2) the party's position on those issues, (3) the re-
lief sought (including a particularized itemization of all elements of damage claimed), and
(4) any offers and counteroffers previously made. In addition, these papers could identify
everyone who will attend from each side and identify their roles.
Id (citations omitted).
260 See supra Part I.B. 1 (describing the narrow-broad continuum); Riskin, supra note 75, at 126-29.
261 Lande, supra note 259, at 129-30. It is worth noting, however, that some lawyers will provide
information regarding their clients' needs or their assessments of the other clients' needs in response to a
question about obstacles to settlement.
262 See, e.g., Ron Kelly, Key Questions Before You Meet, http://www.ronkelly.com/RonKelly
Tools.html#KeyQuestions (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). His website includes such questions as:
List your basic interests, and then number their order of importance to you. (For instance:
time, money, security, get even, get on with life, minimize risk, fairness, future plans, main-
tain a working relationship, etc.). To help identify your real interest in each area, ask your-
self--"Suppose they agree to what I want--exactly what will that do for me?"
Id. See also N.D. CAL. ADR R. 6-7 (c)(4) (stating that the required confidential mediation statement
must "[d]escribe the history and current status of any settlement negotiations and provide any other
information about any interests or considerations not described elsewhere in the statement that might be
pertinent to settlement"). The Northern District also provides a sample letter to its mediators for corre-
spondence with counsel. The letter asks the lawyers to "prepare for the mediation by discussing each of
the following items with your clients ... clients' interests, not just positions, and how these interests
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sponses maintain a narrow focus. 63 We suspect that these lawyers do not
comprehend what information the mediator or program is requesting. They
may understand "interests" as "positions," despite all of the books,2" court
publications,265 and training 6 6 available that distinguish between these con-
cepts. Our proposed rule provides more guidance to enable lawyers (along
with their clients) to take a detailed look at the the range of issues that could
be addressed in mediation.
What might such a rule accomplish? A certain group of lawyers and
clients will welcome the opportunity to supply the requested information.2 67
This group will include lawyers who believe in and implement a broader
approach to client counseling and treat their clients as partners in under-
standing problems and potential solutions.268 They will comply with both
the letter and the spirit of the questions. Such lawyers and clients, along
with their mediators, are likely to come to mediation sessions with a broad-
ened understanding of the situation and the aspects of the situation that the
mediation could potentially explore. Their mediations are more likely to
include expansive problem definitions.
Inevitably, though, others will not embrace the opportunity to answer
the non-traditional questions that we propose. Some lawyers will remain
confused by questions asking for something beyond legal positions and
arguments. Other lawyers and clients, threatened by or bemused at the no-
tion that the exploration of non-legal issues or the expression or identifica-
tion of emotions might become part of mediation sessions, are unlikely to
could be met [and] other side's interests, and how these could be met." ADR Training Handouts, U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, Mediating
with Heart, Soul and Humanity 8 (2006). See also U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Primer for
Parties and Attorneys Participating in the District of Utah's Mediation Program, Mechanics and Proce-
dures, http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/forms/med_primer.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2008) ("Do We Need to
Prepare Anything in Writing? Under the Court's program, each party is required to provide the mediator
with a written pre-conference memorandum at least ten days before the mediation conference. The
memorandum should ... (iii) list the party's needs and interests by priority ......
263 See Engagement Letter, supra note 225.
264 See FISHER, supra note 3, at 40-42.
265 Michigan State Court Administrative Office, Community Dispute Resolution Program, avail-
able at http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/dispute/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) ("When disputants will be
interacting with one another in the future, mediation can help to build a framework for future interaction
based upon mutual interests and needs rather than adversarial positions.").
266 ANTONIA ENGEL AND BENEDIKT KORF, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., NEGOTIATION AND
MEDIATION TECHNIQUES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 109 (2005) ("Mediators need to
support conflict stakeholders in identifying and focusing on underlying interests rather than fixed posi-
tions."), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/aOO32e/aOO32eOO.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
267 It is possible, for example, that "collaborative" and "cooperative" lawyers already are asking
these sorts of questions. See Lande, supra note 218, at 626 (describing the collaborative law process, as
part of which clients commit to participating in interest-based negotiation).
268 See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-
AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 6-9 (1999).
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take the questions seriously and will give pro forma answers. Still other
lawyers and clients might make the strategic choice to submit incomplete
answers to certain questions, particularly if they fear that complete answers
would undermine their negotiation strategies.269
Though any of these latter responses by lawyers will keep the pre-
mediation submissions from achieving the potential we have described, we
do not suggest punishment for lawyers or clients who submit incomplete
answers. Our proposal provides parties with the opportunity to address a
broader version of their dispute; parties should also have the power to ad-
dress only narrow aspects of their dispute in a mediation. We hope, though,
that the simple requirement that lawyers and clients consider and answer
these questions together will have a salutary effect.27 ° The attempt to craft
responsive answers could inspire useful dialogues between lawyers and
clients, which in some cases could even lead to negotiated resolutions out-
side of mediation. The invitation to develop a heightened awareness of non-
litigation issues, underlying interests, and the cognitive or emotional di-
mensions of conflicts may increase the likelihood that lawyers or clients
will see opportunities to use such interests or dimensions after they are in
mediation sessions and better able to assess the motives and needs of the
other side. The content of the pre-mediation submission may simply give
mediators increased confidence in the legitimacy of asking questions re-
garding interests, emotions, and other non-litigation issues.271 All of these
impacts should increase the number of mediation sessions in which problem
definition results from intentional decision-making rather than reflexive
mimicry of the narrow framing that characterizes litigation.
The potential benefits of this rule depend on the percentage of parties
and lawyers who take it seriously. The history of discovery offers one ex-
ample of lawyers' values undermining a litigation innovation's lofty
goals.272 Indeed, in order for our proposed court rule to be effective, courts
269 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 234, at 30-34 (describing the tension between the drive to
"create" value and "claim" value in negotiations, which results in parties withholding or concealing
information even when disclosure would benefit them both).
270 See Larrick, supra note 223, at 318.
271 See Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky De-
faults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 94,
112 (2005) (hypothesizing that as a result of the status quo bias and other psychological and cognitive
biases, "the majority of disputes will be dealt with by application of the default" dispute resolution
approach). See also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227, 1228-29 (2003) (examining the relationship between the status quo bias and the endowment effect
and describing the effect of the status quo bias as "individuals tend[ing] to prefer the present state of the
world to alternative states, all other things being equal"); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625-30 (1998) (examining the application of the
status quo bias to contract rules).
272 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1304, 1313 (1978).
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may also need to commit to significant involvement in oversight and en-
forcement. 2"I It is likely that judicial staff members would need to monitor
to ensure that the forms are completed. To give a rule such as this a chance
of being effective, the bench and bar would need to collaborate in develop-
ing numerous aspects of the rule and its implementation, 74 including the
precise wording of particular questions, educational programs for lawyers
and mediators, and appropriate monitoring mechanisms. These measures
may sound unattractive to courts that hope mediation will reduce the need
for judicial oversight of lawyers and clients. Yet they may also encourage
lawyers, in their roles as counselors and officers of the court, to be more
effective in understanding their clients, counseling them, and helping them
come to resolutions that respond to their real needs.275
2. A Court Rule for Existing Programs that is Directed Primarily
Toward Mediators
We also offer a second approach to creating a court rule. Courts may
require that their mediators ask some or all of the mapping and setting
questions in pre-mediation conversations or during mediation sessions, and
that they be competent to respond appropriately to such answers. Imple-
In this context, it is indeed naive to expect that discovery, armed only with its own execu-
tional rules, could somehow resist the inroads of the adversarial and competitive pressures
that dominate its surroundings....
[A]dversary litigation and competitive economics offer no institutionalized rewards for dis-
closure of potentially relevant data. They instead offer many institutional deterrents to full
disclosure.
Id. But see Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking
What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 958 (2004) (observing that
discovery was intended to enable parties to reach their own resolutions and it has had just this effect,
due to the information provided, the cost of discovery, and the reconfiguration of the plaintiff's bar and
finding that these combine to create "a climate of rational risk aversion and a slight preference for set-
tlement in most cases").
273 See McAdoo, supra note 49, at 405, 472 (noting that lawyers' "voluntary" use of mediation is
often a response to their perception that judges will order them into the process anyway); McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 49, at 535.
274 See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming
for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES 1, 3 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds., 2004) (describing the value of involving both
bench and bar in development or revision of court-connected ADR program).
275 It may even be possible to be a bit more optimistic about the effects of our proposed rule. ADR
administrators in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, for example, perceive
that the lawyers who practice frequently in their court have become more responsive to questions re-
garding interests. The court references interests repeatedly-in its rules, publications, required confiden-
tial information statements, and evaluation forms. In addition, mediators raise the parties' needs in pre-
mediation conferences with lawyers and mediation sessions. See E-mail from Daniel Bowling & How-
ard Herman to authors (Jan. 28, 2008) (on file with authors).
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mentation of this proposal, like the one explained above, would require
some work by the courts. This might include training sessions for mediators
as well as lawyers. In the latter sessions, lawyers would learn that they and
their clients would be asked some or all of the mapping and setting ques-
tions before or during mediation sessions. Indeed, courts that provide edu-
cational information to lawyers about mediation276 for distribution to their
clients could include these sorts of questions in their explanation of what to
expect in mediation. At the end of each mediation session, courts also could
administer evaluation forms that ask litigants and their lawyers whether
they had the opportunity to reveal the issues that were relevant to their dis-
pute and to choose-or at least to have input into the choice of277-the is-
sues to be addressed in their mediation. Finally, court staff could monitor
mediators periodically to ensure that they are asking questions about inter-
ests, the non-legal dimensions of conflict, and litigants' preferences regard-
ing the definition of the problems to be addressed in mediation.278 The in-
formation gained through such monitoring could be used to improve the
effectiveness of mediators and to make decisions about training, retention,
and assignment of mediators.
Though we are not proposing the use of any defined model of media-
tion, we are inspired by the successful program design used by the U.S.
Postal Service ("USPS") to institutionalize its transformative mediation
program (i.e., Resolve Employment Disputes, Reach Equitable Solutions
Swiftly, or "REDRESS").27 9 Consistent with its goals for its program, the
USPS decided, after the first year of the program, that its mediators should
employ Transformative Mediation." To implement this decision, the pro-
gram required its mediators to participate in special training sessions,28" '
276 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Court ADR Template Forms, Guides, and Reports,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/forumsguidesreports.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (website of the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, which includes brochures used by various
courts).
277 Researchers have used this variation when assessing parties' perceptions of their level of con-
trol over mediation outcomes. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 181-82; Wissler,
supra note 49, at 661-62; SCHILDT ET AL., supra note 50, at 29-30.
278 Commentators have proposed various mechanisms to assess mediators' performance. See, e.g.,
TEST DESIGN PROJECT, PERFORMANCE-BASED ASSESSMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR USE IN SELECTING,
TRAINING, AND EVALUATING MEDIATORS 19-28 (1995); Grace E. D'Alo, Accountability in Special
Education Mediation: Many a Slip 'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2003)
(describing results of special education mediation observations using a variation of the evaluation forms
developed by Test Design Project).
279 Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESSTM Pro-
gram: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 401-02 (2001).
280 LISA B. BINGHAM, MEDIATION AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 14-15 (2003), available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/
pdfs/BinghamReport.pdf.
281 See id. at 404.
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conducted extensive national "stakeholder training" to prepare employees
and managers to participate constructively in these mediation sessions,282
and established a corps of ADR Specialists to observe mediators and ensure
the quality of their approach and techniques. 3 The USPS REDRESS pro-
gram has been very successful. It is credited with reducing the number of
EEOC filings284 and improving managers' handling of conflict outside of
mediation sessions,2 5 one of the goals of the program. The USPS continues
to monitor the REDRESS program for quality, voluntary usage rate, and
settlement rate.28 6 Ultimately, the USPS can serve as a model of an institu-
tion that carefully defined the goals and character of its mediation program,
and invested in widespread education and targeted oversight to achieve
those goals.
Nonetheless, critics are likely to raise many concerns regarding our
second proposal. Training and monitoring can be expensive, and attempts to
broaden the problem definition may not seem appropriate, or likely to bear
fruit, in every case. In addition, mediators who choose to raise these ques-
tions during the mediation session might face rigid time constraints. Many
non-family civil mediations involve a single session lasting only two to
three hours.2 7 Our third proposal responds to such challenges.
3. A New Program to Offer "Customized" Court-Connected
Mediation
Our third proposal is that courts should offer to "customize" every
mediation. "Standard" (or "default") 288 mediation is our term for court-
oriented mediation as it is generally practiced.289 In standard mediation, the
presumptive focus is on litigation issues, with indirect reference to eco-
nomic issues; there is no assumption that core or community issues will be
282 See Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: Lessons
Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375, 381-82 (2001) (describing the
importance of training over 20,000 Postal Service employees on "the tenets of transformative media-
tion").
283 See Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 279, at 404.
284 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 145, 158 (2004); Lisa B. Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novac, Mediation's Impact on Formal
Discrimination Complaint Filing: Before and After REDRESSTM Program at the U.S. Postal Service, 21
REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 308, 326 (2001).
285 See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of Workplace
Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601, 607-08 (1997); Bingham, supra
note 284, at 158.
286 Welsh, supra note 80, at 592.
287 See Wissler, supra note 49, at 651-56.
288 See Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 271, at 83 (referring to traditional litigation as a "sticky
default").
289 It would be more accurate, but more awkward, to call this "standard law-focused mediation."
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addressed. "Customized" mediation would begin with some form of map-
ping and would include an explicit process for setting the problem defini-
tion. The focus of this forum would be designed to fit the particular fuss
that the parties wish to address.29 We suspect that in court-connected me-
diation, the fuss almost always will require the discussion of litigation is-
sues, but also will include other issues.29 '
Because there has been so much debate about what should occur in
mediation, we want to note that we are not proposing that courts offer two
mutually-exclusive and rigid categories of mediation. Our proposal would
allow parties and lawyers to "customize" their mediation, or, by choosing
standard mediation, to avoid all of the time and effort that would be re-
quired for such customization. The opportunity to customize is available in
other settings (e.g., in the purchase of cars, computers, clothing, even tax
advice). It turns out that most people are willing to buy their cars off the lot,
their computers at the major retailers, and their clothing off the rack. Stan-
dardization offers predictability and efficiency. Perhaps most parties and
lawyers will prefer to participate in a standard mediation.292 Still, under this
proposal, parties and lawyers will have the chance to consider whether their
disputes are unique or could be handled better if certain non-litigation is-
sues are included. For these parties and lawyers, a "customized" process
will be available. To be clear, customization of the problem definition often
will result from the customization of mediation procedures.293
Some courts already offer such customization on a regular basis.294 For
example, the Circuit Mediation Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recognizes that "[e]ach case presents unique circumstances
and personalities" and therefore it determines the most appropriate settle-
ment procedures on a "case-by-case basis," generally after an initial tele-
phone or in-person conference that "provides counsel and the Mediator the
opportunity to exchange information and determine a process that might
290 See generally Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
291 Perhaps this option should be described as "litigation-oriented-plus" in the same way that
Justice O'Connor's analysis of minimum contacts in Asahi is sometimes described as "stream of com-
merce plus." Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jursidiction, the Internet, and
the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS 575, 585 (1998) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). We are sensitive, however, to the possibility that there may be
some rare cases in which the parties choose not to discuss litigation issues.
292 We recognize that there is a danger that distinguishing "standard" and "customized" mediation
will result in the reification of the "standard" model. This is not our intent. Instead, we simply want to
recognize the existence of standard mediation and make explicit the opportunity for customization.
293 See generally Riskin, supra note 159.
294 Some private providers also regularly customize their mediation sessions, generally as a result
of pre-mediation discussions. See ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING
THE QUALITY OF MEDIATION, FINAL REPORT 12-13 (2008) (describing "case-by-case customization of
mediation process").
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provide the greatest opportunity for resolution. 295 Similarly, when parties
fail to stipulate a particular ADR process while litigating in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, members of that court's ADR
legal staff conduct telephone conferences to help lawyers and parties
"choose or customize an ADR process that meets the needs of the par-
ties. '296 For courts such as these, our proposal may be unnecessary. The
opportunity for customization is already part of their culture.
For other courts, however, this undertaking will be quite new and will
require the education of mediators, lawyers, and citizens. The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California currently has an extensive pub-
lication describing available ADR processes.297 The court requires lawyers
to certify that they have read the publication. 29" Lawyers also must review
the publication with their clients.299 Similarly, courts offering customized
mediation could require lawyers and parties to view a short video available
online and then show a certificate of completion before scheduling their
mediation.0 ° Some form of monitoring also may be necessary to maintain a
distinction between "standard" and "custom" mediation,3 1 but this also
may be a self-enforcing initiative due to the parties' involvement in shaping
the process.
C. Likely Concerns Regarding the Efficacy of the Proposed Court
Initiatives
All of these proposals are likely to encounter resistance. Critics of the
three-step method may point to likely difficulties in its implementation. For
example, what if one party very much wants to discuss core interests while
the other is repelled by that notion, and the parties then disagree on how to
"set" the problem? In considering this concern, it is important once again to
295 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, supra note 45, at 2.
296 U.S. Dist. Court of the N. Dist. of Cal., supra note 213, at 20. See also N.D. CAL. ADR R. 3-
5(c); N.D. CAL. CIV. R. 16-8(c).
297 U.S. Dist. Court. of the N. Dist. of Cal., supra note 213.
298 N.D. CAL. ADR R. 3-5(b)(1).
299 See, e.g., id. at 18. The Northern District of California requires lawyers to certify to the court
that they have read this publication. N.D. CAL. Civ. R. 16-8. Lawyers are also required to review the
publication with their clients. Id. Other courts have found that a worrisome percentage of parties indi-
cate their lawyers provided them with "almost no information ... about the mediation process" or "how
the process would work," suggesting the need to target education directly at parties. See ANDERSON &
P1, supra note 50, at 61.
300 Our thanks to Sharon Press for this suggestion. Telephone interview with Sharon Press (Oct.
10,2007).
301 We do not suggest a rigid dichotomy. A mediation that begins on the standard mediation track
might evolve into a customized mediation, and vice versa. But we hope this rule will encourage con-
scious decision making about the problem-definition and mediation procedures. Riskin, supra note 159,
at 13-15.
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highlight what we are not proposing. We are not suggesting that courts re-
quire a broad problem definition in their mediation program, or that courts
require lawyers to reveal information about their clients' underlying inter-
ests that they or the clients wish to keep secret for strategic or personal rea-
sons. We propose only that the parties should have a real opportunity to
influence the problem definition by considering a series of issues and inter-
ests that do not routinely appear in the kinds of mediations we have been
discussing and by considering whether to make these issues and interests
part of their mediation. If the parties disagree about the appropriate breadth
of the problem definition, we believe that the mediation must incorporate
only those issues all parties accept. In many cases, of course, this will mean
reverting to the status quo, "standard" mediation with the narrow but en-
tirely legitimate focus on litigation issues. We believe, however, that mere
consideration of these issues and interests will result in a broader problem
definition in some cases in which that is appropriate.
A next set of concerns may reflect skepticism regarding the need for
"customized" mediation. Judges and lawyers may argue that if courts offer
settlement conferences or early neutral evaluation along with mediation, 302
there is no need to distinguish between "standard" and "customized" media-
tion. These critics may assume that settlement conferences and early neutral
evaluation focus on the legal merits of each side's case and that the scope of
mediation is necessarily broader. The stereotype regarding judicial settle-
ment conferences has substantial, though dated, empirical support." 3 The
character of early neutral evaluation, however, can vary substantially with
302 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California offers early neutral
evaluation, settlement conferences, and non-binding arbitration as well as mediation. Joshua D.
Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1487, 1489-90 (1994). Virginia offers both facilitative mediation and settlement conferences with retired
judges. See Geetha Ravindra, Virginia's Judicial Settlement Conference Program, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 293,
295-98, 300-01 (2005). The Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Canada similarly offers both interest-
based mediation and judicial dispute resolution (JDR), and Civil Practice Note No. 11 specifically
provides that interest-based mediation "is not intended to derogate in any way from the JDR program."
Court of Queen's Bench of Aberta, Civil Practice Note No. 11, Court-Annexed Mediation, at 1 (2004),
available at http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/civil/pnl lCourtAnnexedMediation.pdf.
303 See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 216, at 287-89 ("[J]udicial intervention observed in the
settlement conferences primarily supported positional bargaining. Very few of the judges strove to
create reasonable settlement terms of the problem-solving kind."); James A. Wall, Jr. et al., Judicial
Participation in Settlement, 1984 MO. J. DiSP. RESOL. 25, 29, 32. Meanwhile, research indicates that
lawyers are relatively consistent in their preferences regarding judges' behaviors in settlement confer-
ences. See D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 35-36 (1986)
(noting that attorneys prefer a settlement judge who points out evidence or law that attorneys misunder-
stand or are overlooking); Dale E. Rude & James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How
Judges and Lawyers View It, 72 JUDICATURE 175, 176-77 (1988) (reporting that attorneys prefer judges
to inform them of how similar cases have settled and to argue logically for concessions, but do not
prefer judges to share their evaluations of the case with clients or discuss with the lawyers the high risk
of going to trial).
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the preferences of the neutral."° Most importantly, though, and as we have
argued throughout this Article, most court-connected mediation used by
most average citizens is "one-size-fits-all," and that size is modeled after
the lawsuit." 5 Thus, we believe that such presumed differences between
mediation on the one hand, and settlement conferences or early neutral
evaluation on the other, do not reflect most actual practice.
For all of our proposed court initiatives, we have indicated that courts
will need to invest in training, education, and monitoring. How can already-
overtaxed courts afford this? There is no easy answer to this question. We
believe, however, that any court that currently sponsors a mediation pro-
gram should already be investing in training, education, and monitoring so
that it can be confident in the services that are being provided in its name. 6
And, as noted above in Part II.B.3, some pioneering courts are making these
investments with concrete results.30 7
The most troublesome and systemic objection, however, is the critique
that lawyers will resist the opportunity to expand mediation's problem defi-
nition for the same reasons that they embrace the focus that currently char-
acterizes court-connected mediation. Primarily, of course, they believe that
this narrow focus generally serves their clients' interests. In addition, the
narrow problem definition is consistent with most lawyers' core interests in
autonomy, a dominant role, and appreciation.3 8 To meet these core inter-
ests, lawyers' routine practice often involves spending substantial time
transforming their clients' unwieldy disputes and expectations into claims
and remedies that can be addressed by the law.309 The focus of most ordi-
nary mediations on knowledge of the law and litigation expertise reinforces
lawyers' claims to the privileges of professionalism, including autonomy,
status, and substantial fees. 10 For example, a lawyer representing a client
on a contingency fee basis might fear that a mediation focused on non-legal
304 See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 302, at 1495-96, 1538 (concluding that, in the Early
Neutral Evaluation Program of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the role of
the neutral varied greatly, depending principally on the identity of the neutral, and sometimes included
facilitation without any evaluation). As a result of this study, the Northern District of California has
educated its neutrals regarding the process differences. See E-mail from Daniel Bowling & Howard
Herman to authors (Jan. 28, 2008) (on file with authors).
305 Pun intended.
306 McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 274, at 1, 12-13.
307 Brazil, supra note 47, at 253.
308 See supra Part I.B.l(3).
309 See Felstiner, supra note 120, at 645-67 (observing that whatever harm or dispute a party brings
to a professional, the professional will transform the harm or dispute so that the professional's expertise
is appropriate for its resolution). See also Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representa-
tion as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1367-82 (1992);
Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9
JUST. SYS. J. 151 (1984);
310 See note 145 and sources cited therein.
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concerns would translate into a largely non-monetary settlement."' Finally,
a law-and-litigation problem definition matches most lawyers' psychologi-
cal preferences for the resolution of disputes based on the application of
standards and rules and the avoidance of emotional issues.3"2 Viewed from
this perspective, it may not be in lawyers' own best interests to encourage
their clients to venture beyond litigation (and, to a lesser extent, economic)
issues. Under this view, our proposals-whether requiring lawyers to con-
sult with their clients regarding the scope of the mediation, requiring media-
tors to offer the opportunity to broaden the problem definition, or offering
"customized" mediation-would be doomed to irrelevance, at best.
This concern is well grounded. There are, however, interesting hints of
change in the legal profession3"3 that may both encourage and gain support
from courts' adoption of our proposals. Many lawyers, for example, express
a desire to use a broader problem definition in working with clients to re-
solve disputes, but perceive insurmountable hurdles to doing so.3'4 A grow-
ing number of lawyers are overcoming some of the hurdles by forming
groups of "collaborative" or "cooperative" lawyers who support each other
through their practice protocols.3"5 Though practice models started and have
blossomed in the family law area, there are now initiatives bringing aspects
of the "collaborative" or "cooperative" approaches to other types of dis-
putes,316 including the "ordinary" matters that have served as the focus of
this Article. In addition, certain influential elements of the commercial bar
have expressed their appreciation for a mediation process that includes liti-
gation analysis, but also explores the underlying interests that an approach
focused primarily on litigation issues might not capture. In a recent survey
of lawyers with substantial experience in commercial mediation, a strong
majority said that satisfying the parties' underlying interests was one of
their goals in "all," "almost all," or "most" of the cases that had gone to
311 See Stemlight, supra note 178, at 320-21, 327-28 (describing lawyers' and clients' potentially
diverging monetary incentives).
312 See Daicoff, supra note 35, at 1365-66; Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and
the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 157 n.64 (2001) (citing to several studies showing the predominance of a "think-
ing" orientation among law students and lawyers); Vemellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indica-
tor, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 92-93 (1995-1996).
313 See MACFARLANE, supra note 156.
314 See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 216, at 257 (even though litigators would like the methods
used in their negotiations to be more "problem-solving" and less "positional," this has not happened,
perhaps because of a "combination of persistent litigator habits, a limited vocabulary of negotiation, and
the time and expense necessary to change established practices").
315 See Lande, supra note 218, at 689; John Lande, Possibilitiesfor Collaborative Law: Ethics and
Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315, 1325 (2003); Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from
The Collaborative Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 186.
316 See John Lande, Evading Evasion: How Protocols Can Improve Civil Case Results, 21
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 149, 163 (2003).
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mediation."1 7 These respondents also rated "understanding parties' inter-
ests" as a very important skill for effective mediators." 8 Another survey
yielded strong support among business executives and outside counsel for
finding outcomes that satisfy both parties' underlying interests rather than
seeking only the largest possible concessions." 9
Presumably, the lawyers and clients involved in large, well-funded
commercial disputes do their best to negotiate a solution before they turn to
mediation. For the difficult cases that do not settle through negotiation,
these lawyers and clients endeavor to hire the mediators who are prepared
to go beyond the litigation risk analysis that is the lawyers' stock-in-trade.
Indeed, our three-step method may simply formalize an exploration that
many such lawyers and clients expect from good commercial mediators, at
least in complex, multi-party cases.32 °
The concern about lawyers' resistance to our proposals also suggests
the need to help the lawyers representing clients in ordinary cases see and
appreciate the shortcomings of the dominant model of court-oriented me-
diation for at least some of their clients. Such cases, after all, are "ordinary"
only when looked at through a standard "legal" lens. They involve legal
issues that are "ordinary" and amounts of money that are "ordinary"-to
lawyers and judges. But to the one-shot players, these disputes are typically
317 ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 7 (reporting that
81% of mediation users viewed satisfying parties' underlying interests as an important goal in half or
more of their cases); ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION
QUALITY, Survey Responses, at 5 (Apr. 16, 2007 Draft) (on file with authors) (68.5% of mediation users
identified "satisfy parties' underlying interests" as a goal in "all or almost all" cases, with 13% identify-
ing this as a goal in "most cases").
318 See ABA, Mean Survey Responses, supra note 43.
319 John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 188 (2000). Executives were asked how often "it is appropriate for busi-
nesses to try to find outcomes addressing the underlying interests of each party as opposed to seeking
the largest possible concessions," when considering "the practical realities of litigation between two
businesses[?]" Id. Lande reported that:
[M]ore than three-quarters (82%) of each type of respondent said that it would be appropriate
to seek outcomes addressing underlying interests in more than half the cases. Although the
outside counsel gave significantly higher responses (an average rating of 8.1) than executives
(who gave an average rating of 7.2), clearly the vast majority of all three types of respon-
dents said that it is normally appropriate to focus on underlying interests.
Id.
320 As noted above in Part ll.B.2, the U.S. Postal Service has institutionalized a mediation program
that uses the transformative model, which focuses on facilitating parties' "voice and choice" rather than
litigation risk analysis. Aware of the USPS' success with this model in reducing EEOC filings and
increasing managers' conflict resolution capacities, other agencies have also chosen to institutionalize it.
This may be viewed as another example of sophisticated parties' interest in using a broader focus in
mediation in order to achieve meaningful resolution. But see Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Management: Integrated Conflict Management Systems, in Moffitt & Bardone, supra note 44, at 379-
83 (stating that "however well intentioned they are currently, ICMS [integrated conflict management
systems] threaten to become another tool by which management wields power" and subverts conflict
that should erupt).
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extraordinary, once-in-a-lifetime events. And every litigant brings along
unique history, circumstances, and interests. Our proposals offer relatively
painless ways for lawyers to help some clients find more suitable responses
to their unique needs. And we encourage courts to offer to collaborate with
members of the bar to improve upon our proposals and make them more
effective.321
Critics may raise a final set of concerns, which deal with the appropri-
ate role of the courts: should the courts invest in offering to broaden the
subject matter of a mediation session when access to this public resource
has historically been conditioned upon narrowing the subject matter of a
dispute in order to make it manageable and consistent with the unique mis-
sion of the courts?32 We turn to these issues next.
III. THE COURTS AND FOSTERING APPROPRIATE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
Though strong psychological, economic, and social forces will always
support the maintenance of the status quo, the courts have evolved through-
out their history in response to the changing needs of society and the emer-
gence of competing, successful models of dispute resolution.323 Examples
abound. In medieval Europe, which had a patchwork of contradictory local
laws and business practices, a private system known as the Law Merchant
arose to create and apply commerce-facilitating rules and procedures to the
resolution of international merchants' disputes.324 Over time, ordinary
courts throughout Europe incorporated the Law Merchant's principles into
commercial law.325 In England, after an ad hoc and morality-based system
of equity arose in response to the rigidity of the writs used by the common
law courts, the courts evolved to include a complementary Court of Chan-
cery available to provide relief when the common law courts could not.326
321 See Lande, supra note 259, at 129-30.
322 Indeed, one of the authors has previously observed that "[f]ew stakeholders in the civil non-
family context seem to worry about producing outcomes that respond to litigants' unique extra-legal
needs or represent parties' self-determination or maintain or enhance relationships. If they are honest,
courts will clarify that though these objectives are laudable, they must yield to the objects that are more
salient to the mission of a public civil litigation system." McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 426.
323 See Pearlstein, supra note 250, at 774-80 (describing the adoption of dispute resolution prac-
tices in medieval Europe, seventeenth century colonial America, and the 'Wild' West following the
California Gold Rush).
324 Id. at 774-75.
325 Id. See also LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
11-16 (1983); Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644,
647 (1989).
326 See Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 346-51 (2007). A few
centuries later, in 1938, the United States continued this particular evolution by merging common law
and equity into one system in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The
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More recently, in the U.S., the congestion and conservatism of the courts,
coupled with the profound needs unleashed by the Great Depression and the
innovations of the New Deal, led to the creation of administrative adjudica-
tion.3 27 Though the judiciary initially objected to the usurpation of its role,
courts now display substantial deference to administrative decision-
making.328
As noted in Part II.C, it is increasingly clear that certain elements of
the bar, and their clients, see the value in broadening problem definitions in
appropriate cases and seek out mediators who will provide such services.3 29
Meanwhile, some judges, court administrators, and policymakers may see
our proposals as a means to achieve mediation's original promise as a dis-
tinctive supplement to the usual practice and focus of litigation--or to re-
awaken the dream of the multi-door courthouse.33° Some courts' definitions
of mediation are particularly evocative of mediation's original promise.331
The local rules of the federal district courts for the Eastern District of New
York and the Northern District of California, for example, note that "[a]
hallmark of mediation is its capacity to expand traditional settlement dis-
cussions and broaden resolution options, often by exploring litigant needs
and interests that may be formally independent of the legal issues in contro-
versy." '332 Some courts have provided the resources and staff needed to
promote mediation of a quality that lives up to its "hallmark." '333 Most
courts, however, have been either unable or unwilling to do much more
than monitor their mediation programs for their settlement rates.334 We reit-
erate that we are not proposing that a court require all parties to participate
in a mediation that expands traditional settlement discussions. However,
our proposal would end the current situation in which most parties' choice
is foreordained by the preferences, or habits, of lawyers and insurance
claims adjusters, as well as the "one-size-fits-all" demands of mass process-
Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 62 (2004).
327 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System,
5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 124-25 (2004) (citing George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557, 1574
(1996)).
328 See id. at 125-26.
329 See supra notes 43-44 and sources cited therein.
330 See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra
note 27, at 65, 83-84 (first introducing the concept that was later labeled as the "multi-door court-
house"). Excerpts from the Pound Conference are also found in Addresses Delivered at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79
(1976).
331 See supra note 45 and sources cited therein.
332 E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.11(a); N.D. CAL. ADR R. 6-1.
333 See supra notes 295-302, sources cited therein and accompanying text.
334 See Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and
Possibilities, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, supra note 274, at 297, 302.
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ing. Parties would undertake an informed consideration of their mediation
options and have the opportunity to choose the problem definition most
responsive to their needs. We view this change as particularly important for
the one-shot users, individual citizens who might otherwise never know
they could receive the advantages of "custom" mediation.
Our proposal also would not diminish the courts' focus on dispute
resolution pursuant to the rule of law. As any first-year law student quickly
learns, the rule of law sounds substantial, but actually is a very slippery
concept heavily influenced by context and self-interest.335 Customized me-
diations under our proposals would still incorporate a litigation focus and
discussions of the applicable substantive law. But they would also offer the
opportunity to supplement that focus.336 We believe that empowering par-
ties to choose whether to grapple with other issues would enhance their
sense of being treated fairly by their courts.337 In other words, this option
would influence their perceptions of the procedural justice offered by the
courts, and procedural justice has been shown to have a profound influence
on parties' perceptions of substantive fairness and institutional legiti-
macy.3 1 Ultimately, we believe that parties' judgments regarding both sub-
stantive and procedural fairness would be improved by the opportunity to
elect the problem definition that they perceive as most appropriate.
It is also possible that our proposal would contribute to courts' effec-
tiveness in assisting parties who have pressing business interests, as well as
parties like the Sabias, whose need for cognitive and emotional resolution is
very strong and currently unmet by procedures with a narrow litigation fo-
cus. The courts have shown a willingness to adapt in order to respond better
to the needs of particular subsets of disputants. 39 For example, there are
now business courts, mental health courts, juvenile courts, domestic vio-
335 See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 165 (Chris-
topher Honeyman & Andrea Schneider eds., 2006); Deutsch, supra note 253, at 41, 43-44.
336 Another useful way to think about this broadened focus is through the idea of using two tables
in a negotiation. One would employ a narrow, adversarial perspective (the "net-expected-outcome
table"); the other would deal with underlying interests (the "interest-based table"). See ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 234, at 226-46.
337 See Keith G. Allred, Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with Coopera-
tion, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 44, at 83, 91 ("If we are in a dispute with
someone and he or she asks us what we think the process should be to try to resolve it, we will feel the
process is fairer whatever the process turns out to be.").
338 Welsh, supra note 108, at 820-26.
339 Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just The (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather but Nonetheless Essential)
Facts Ma 'am: What We Know and Don't Know About Problem-Solving Courts, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1027, 1030 (2003) (citing Center for Court Innovation, Problem-Solving Justice,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/ (follow "Problem-Solving Justice" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13,
2008) (noting that "there are literally thousands of problem-solving courts that are testing new ap-
proaches to difficult cases where social, human and legal problems intersect")).
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lence courts, drug courts, and community courts.340 In each of these con-
texts, courts34" ' have concluded that their traditional processes and remedies
were not sufficiently effective. Domestic violence courts arose, for exam-
ple, because victims sought orders of protection only as a last resort after
long periods of abuse. 42 In order to promote the safety of these victims
more effectively, domestic violence courts introduced batterer intervention
programs, dramatically expanded judges' responsibility for monitoring, and
forged partnerships with other community agencies.343 Judges in these
courts supplemented their traditional tools in order to help people change
their lives. Mental health courts similarly respond to the needs of a particu-
lar set of litigants.3" Litigants who meet eligibility requirements are able to
choose whether to take part in programs that will require participation in
mental health assessments, individualized treatment plans, ongoing judicial
monitoring, and the completion of mandated treatment programs.345 These
options are certainly more labor-intensive for the courts, but they also ap-
pear to address more effectively the issues that played a significant role in
bringing these litigants to the courts.346 The same philosophy would support
offering the opportunities we have proposed.
Finally, though other countries' courts reflect their own procedures,
histories, and values, it may be useful for courts in the U.S. to consider347
some aspects of the mediation program that the courts of the Netherlands
recently institutionalized.34 There, mediating and judging are understood as
different roles in terms of process and problem definition.349 Dutch judges,
340 See generally Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 2 NAT'L DRUG
CT. INST. REV. 2 (1999); Berman & Gulick, supra note 339; Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are
Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459
(2004); Donald J. Farole, Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Mainstream Courts: Lessons
for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57 (2005).
341 Or sometimes only a few innovative judges. See Farole et al., supra note 340, at 68-69.
342 See Berman & Gulick, supra note 339, at 1041 ("The primary stated objective of most domestic
violence courts is the enhancement of victim safety.").
343 See id. at 1042-44; Center for Court Intervention, Domestic Violence Courts, http://www.court
innovation.org/ (follow "Problem-Solving Justice" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
344 Id. at 1036.
345 See Berman & Gulick, supra 339, at 1030.
346 Id. at 1031-34.
347 Before establishing their program, the Netherlands carefully investigated U.S. courts' experi-
ence in institutionalizing mediation. See Annie de Roo & Rob Jagtenberg, Mediation in the Netherlands:
Past-Present-Future, 6.4 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2002), http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-8.html.
348 See Bert Niemeijer & Machteld Pel, Court-Based Mediation in the Netherlands: Research,
Evaluation and Future Expectations, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 345, 346-47 (2005).
349 Judge Machteld Pel, who heads the Netherlands' court mediation program, has identified four
categories of disputes that are brought to Dutch courts:
[I] Pure procedure (The civil procedures that really are what they seem to be; the parties
bring up a legal question in front of the judge and that is really what it is about. The dispute
is completely resolved with the court ruling. The interests here are the same as claims.)[; 2]
Process procedures (Procedures where the parties actually have a legal dispute but doubt that
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who may meet with the parties and lawyers several times to investigate and
attempt to resolve the case, are taught to ask, "Will my decision solve your
problem?" If the answer is "yes," then the judge should retain the case, con-
tinuing the investigation into its legal merits and issuing a decision.35 On
the other hand, if the parties acknowledge their interest in non-legal issues,
the judge urges them to try mediation because it can help them address all
the issues that fit within the appropriate definition of their problem.35' It is
possible that only a minority of cases will be resolved by court-connected
mediation in the Netherlands," 2 but the country supports many different
there is a possibility of 'getting their justice' on material grounds or in relation to the burden
of proof. For that reason, they introduce all sorts of additional (procedural) decision points in
order to, at least, get their way on formal points or improper grounds. The court decision on
the additional decision points puts no end to the underlying dispute. The claim that contains
real interests is overshadowed by improper procedural interests.)[; 3] Shadow procedures
(Procedures where the parties wish to achieve something that cannot be accorded by law.
They propose therefore something that is the next best. They bring a lawsuit about the
'shadow' of their real wishes. The legal decision does not end their dispute but can bring
closer one party in the dispute to the desired outcome. The interests and claims differ but the
interests do motivate the procedure.)[; and 4] Pretence procedures (Procedures that are initi-
ated or brought only because of the feeling of frustration, impotence or other strong feelings
instead of business, logical motives based on objective criteria. The motivation is that 'those
who do not hear must feel.' The parties climb the ladder of escalation and prefer 'to go under
together' rather than give in a little to the other party. The court decision cannot bring an end
to the conflict. The motivation for bringing a lawsuit is not interests but emotions and mis-
communication.)
Machteld Pel, Doorverwijzing naar mediation in de civiele procedure: extra service of brancheverag-
ing?, 4 TuDScHRiFT VOOR CIVIELE RECHTSPLEGING 78, 81 (2000) (translation on file with authors). See
also Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil Justice, 22 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 227, 235 (2007) (differentiating between court-appointed mediators and judges
by observing that mediators will not perform judicial duties such as "considering formally presented
evidence and argument, then engaging in thorough research and analysis en route to forming reliable
and binding judgments about the merits of parties' disputes").
350 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Future of Mediation: Court-Connected Mediation in the US. and The
Netherlands Compared, 1 FORUM VOOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 19, 22 (2007); Nancy A. Welsh, En
vergel/king tussen doorverwijizing naar mediation in civiele zaken: voorspelt de ervaring van de
Verenigde Staten (VS) de toekomst van Nederland?, 7 Trema 310, 312 (Sept. 2006) (translation on file
with author). In some ways, the Dutch judges' question is reminiscent of the original relationship be-
tween the courts administering the dual system of equity and law. See Main, supra note 326, at 352-53
(observing that "[e]very order or rule administered in Equity was born of some emergency, to meet
some new condition that was not otherwise remediable in the Common Law courts"). In contrast, few
judges in Minnesota selected "relief is outside the court's jurisdiction" as a significant factor that they
consider when ordering parties to mediation. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 22, at 414 & n.77 (cho-
sen by 13% of the judges surveyed).
351 See Welsh, The Future of Mediation, supra note 350, at 23; Welsh, En vergelfiking, supra note
350, at 312.
352 The number, however, is growing. See MACHTELD PEL, RESULTS OF THE MEDIATION
REFERRAL SYSTEM IN THE NETHERLANDS JUDICIARY 1 (2007), available at http://cameraarbitrale.odc.
mi.it/allegati/utenti/Pel2.pdf.
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"paths to justice" '353 and does not seem to assume that any particular process
should be appropriate for all--or even a majority of--disputes.354
Through our proposal, courts would give lawyers and their clients the
option to participate in a customized forum that includes attention to legal
issues and the other economic, personal core, and community issues that
may play a significant role in achieving real resolution.355 The courts will be
offering a real "value added" for the disputants and disputes that do not
quite fit the mold provided by the standard litigation focus. Indeed, in a
country where most citizens' experience with the court system is as one-
shot players, it seems quite appropriate that our courts should allow such
litigants to provide input into the design of the process that will be most
responsive to the needs of their unique situations. Judge Wayne Brazil has
written that the primary goal of mediators in court-sponsored programs
should be "to promote the participants' confidence in the integrity of the
proceedings." '356 Transparency and inclusiveness are important attributes of
processes designed to earn that respect. In his words:
[T]ransparency, by itself, is not sufficient .... [T]ransparency about process can acquire its
full constructive power only when we include all the participants in the mediation in the key
decisions about which process routes we should follow. In short, inclusiveness is essential to
maximizing both the reality and the potential of process transparency. 
357
CONCLUSION
In one sense, our proposals are quite modest. They simply suggest
mechanisms that could help court-connected mediation programs do what
353 See BEN C.J. VAN VELTHOVEN & MARLIKE TER VOERT, PATHS OF JUSTICE IN THE
NETHERLANDS 23-24 (2005), available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file-id=
17771.
354 See Welsh, En vergeliking, supra note 350, at 311. See also Kritzer, supra note 26, at 353-56
(observing that other countries do not rely as heavily as the U.S. on private litigation for the resolution
of routine disputes or policy implementation).
355 See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 802 (2001) (describing what could and should happen in a negotiation grounded in
morality); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971)
(describing mediation's "capacity to reorient the parties towards each other, not by imposing rules on
them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that
will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another"); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues
in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 67, 86 (highlighting the
connection between mediation, social justice, and procedural justice in urging that disadvantaged people
"need, even more so than advantaged group members, a forum in which their authentic voices and
experiences can be expressed" and observing that mediation, as a forum fostering the expression of such
authentic voices, offers "another locus in American political, social and legal life where ideas about
equality are defined and redefined").
356 Brazil, supra note 47, at 241.
357 Id. at 268.
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many have assumed they already were doing. In another sense, however,
these proposals represent a significant intrusion into "business as usual" in
the mediation of "ordinary" or "routine" cases in court-connected programs.
As we have emphasized, a person injured in an accident, terminated from a
job, or sued for negligence is unlikely to experience the event as routine.
The repeat players can see such matters as routine only through profes-
sional or occupational filters, which allow in only certain kinds of informa-
tion and produce only certain kinds of outcomes through certain kinds of
procedures. We hope that inviting the litigants themselves to reflect upon
and influence the selection of the issues for discussion in their mediations
will enable more one-shot players to get what they need in the procedures
and outcomes of their cases. Our proposals may even produce an intriguing
by-product-making these cases and the journey toward resolution come
alive for at least some of the repeat players. As Marcel Proust wisely wrote,
"The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeing new landscapes, but in
having new eyes."35
358 Marcel Proust, The Captive, in 3 REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST 1, 260 (C.K. Scott Moncrieff
& Terence Kilmartin trans., Random House 1981) (1934).
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